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EATIN' GOOD? NOT IN THIS NEIGHBORHOODt
A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF DISPARITIES IN FOOD
AVAILABILITY AND QUALITY AT
CHAIN SUPERMARKETS IN
POVERTY-STRICKEN AREAS
Nareissa Smith*
Many Americans-especially the poor-face severe hurdles in their attempts to
secure the most basic of human needs-food. One reason for this struggle is the
tendency of chain supermarkets to provide a limited selection of goods and a lower
quality of goods to patrons in less affluent neighborhoods. Healthier items such as
soy milks, fresh fish, and lean meats are not present in these stores, and the produce
that is present is typically well past the peak of freshness. Yet, if the same patron
were to go to another supermarket owned by the same chain--but located in a
wealthier neighborhood-she would find a wide selection of healthy foods and fresh
produce. "hat are the poor people who live in the inner cities--who are
disproportionately African American and Latino-to do? How can they obtain
healthy food against these odds?
This Article argues that the actions of the supermarkets are unconscionable, and
therefore proposes a federal law that will prevent chain grocery stores from engaging
in such practices. The Article first examines the scope of the problem created by these
supermarket practices. The Article then explains why current laws are inadequate to
address this issue. Finally, the Article proposes that Congress use its authority
under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation that would require supermarket
chains to carry the same selection and quality of goods at all stores in the same
chain.
t "Eatin' Good in the Neighborhood" is the former slogan of the Applebee's chain
of family restaurants. See Database of Slogans, Restaurant Advertising Slogans, http://
www.textart.ru/database/english-advertising-slogans/restuarant-advertising-slogans.html (last
visited June 12, 2008).
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INTRODUCTION
"Food for all is a necessity. Food should not be a merchandise, to be
bought and sold as jewels are bought and sold by those who have the
money to buy. Food is a human necessity, like water and air, it should
be available."
-Pearl S. Buck'
Imagine for a moment that you are a single mother attempting to
make ends meet. Your second job has just laid you off, pushing your ends
1. Food Quotes, http://www.foodreference.com/html/qfood.htm (last visited July
7,2008).
further apart.2 Despite your financial straits, your three children still need
to eat.You go to your neighborhood grocery store. While you know the
store is inadequate, you cannot afford the taxi or bus fare to a better store.
You arrive and begin shopping.You read somewhere that the USDA de-
fines a healthy diet as one that "[e]mphasizes fruits, vegetables, whole
grains, and fat-free or low-fat milk and milk products; [i]ncludes lean
meats, poultry, fish, beans, eggs, and nuts; and [i]s low in saturated fats,
trans fats, cholesterol, salt (sodium), and added sugars." 3 You decide to fol-
low the guidelines. Once in the store, you try to find some fresh fruit.You
go to the produce section and discover oranges with white spots and ap-
ples that are more brown than red. You look for other fresh fruit, but
given the limited selection, you settle on some canned peaches in heavy
syrup. You look for lean ground beef, but there isn't any in the store-
only the type mottled with large amounts of fat.You select one pound of
the marbled meat. Finally, you try to find a loaf of whole-wheat bread, but
the store only has white bread. You pay the cashier, and leave the store
disgusted and sad. You vow to do better next time, but in reality, you
know that this scene will repeat itself innumerable times.
Food plays an essential role in the life of every human being. It pro-
vides fuel for the many functions our bodies must perform each day.4
Therefore, food "is arguably the most critical thing that promotes health."'
2. It is quite possible for a person with a job-indeed multiple jobs-to struggle to
make ends meet. In her best-selling book NICKEL AND DIMED, author Barbara Ehrenreich
described her experiences trying to live on minimum wage in America for three months
in various cities. See generally BARBARA EHRENREICH, NiCEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GET-
TING BY IN AMERIcA (2001). She concluded that even when she worked two jobs, she
failed to meet her monthly living expenses in each of the three cities where she con-
ducted her experiment. See id. at 196-98.
3. MyPyramid.gov, USDA Dietary Guidelines, http://www.mypyramid.gov/
guidelines/index.html (last visited June 12, 2008).
4. For instance:
The human body can be thought of as an engine that releases the energy
present in the foods and utilizes it partly for the mechanical work performed
by muscles and in secretory processes and partly for the work necessary to
maintain its structure and functions. The performance of this work is associ-
ated with the production of heat; heat loss is controlled so as to keep body
temperature within a narrow range. Unlike other engines, the human body is
continually breaking down (catabolism) and building up (anabolism) its
component parts. Certain foods supply nutrients essential to the manufacture
of the new material and provide energy needed for the chemical reactions
involved.
Nutrition, human. Encyclopedia Britannica, nutrition, human, http://search.eb.com/eb/
article-25006 3 1 (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
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All food, however, is not created equal. Different foodstuffs have dif-
ferent nutritional values, and as such, vary in their ability to fuel the
human machine. Some foods-particularly those high in fiber and low in
saturated fats, harmful cholesterols and sodium-have a high nutritional
value and are highly recommended by nutritional professionals.6 Con-
versely, foods that are low in fiber, but high in fat, low density cholesterol,
sugar, and sodium have very little nutritional value. In fact, there is so little
nutritional value that these foods are colloquially (and sometimes affec-
tionately) referred to as "junk food.,7
Because food is so important to health, dietary choices can directly
impact a person's wellbeing. For instance, a diet that is high in fiber and
incorporates fresh fruits and vegetables can prevent cellular oxidation and
lower the risk of developing certain cancers.8 Conversely, a diet that em-
phasizes unhealthy foods is more likely to lead to obesity.9 Being
overweight or obese increases the risk of developing many diseases and
conditions, including hypertension, Type 2 diabetes, coronary heart dis-
5. Elisabeth Eisenhauer, In Poor Health: Supermarket Redlining and Urban Nutrition,
53 GEOJOURNAL 125,125 (2001).
6. For example, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the agency
in charge of setting recommended daily allowances of nutrients and making food recom-
mendations such as the "food pyramid" recommends that Americans "[c]onsume a variety
of nutrient-dense foods and beverages within and among the basic food groups while
choosing foods that limit the intake of saturated and trans fats, cholesterol, added sugars,
salt, and alcohol." See News Release, New Dietary Guidelines Will Help Americans Make
Better Food Choices, Live Healthier Lives (Jan. 12 2005), available at http://
www.hhs.gov/news/press/2005pres/20050112.html (last visited July 7, 2008). In addition,
the American Heart Association urges Americans to forego foods high in saturated fats,
trans fats and cholesterol in favor of eating "a variety of fruits and vegetables" and "a vari-
ety of grain products, including whole grains." American Heart Association, Fat, http://
www.americanheart.org/resenter.jhtmnl?identifier=4582 (last visited July 7, 2008).
7. Junk food is generally defined as food that is "high in calories but low in nutri-
tional content." Comment, Nicki Kennedy, Stop in the Name of Public Policy: Limiting 'Junk
Food"Advertisements During Children's Programming, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 503, 517 n.
104 (2008) (citing the Merriam Webster Online Dictionary).
8. See National Library of Medicine & National Institutes of Health, MedlinePlus:
Medical Encyclopedia, Diet and Disease, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/
002096.htm (last visited July 8, 2008).
9. Research is working diligently to establish a link between food choices and
obesity. A comprehensive National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey conducted
by the University of California (Berkeley) found the following:
It is notable that many of the nutrient-poor energy sources seen in these data
come from snack foods and beverages: soft drinks, pastries, chips, candy.
These analyses did not examine the foods by eating occasion (meal vs.
snack). However, it is likely that a pattern of snacking on such nutrient-poor
energy sources is a component of the increasing obesity problem in the
United States.
Gladys Block, Foods Contributing to Energy Intake in the US: Data from NHANES III and
NHANES 1999-2000, 17 J. OF FOOD COMPOSITION AND ANALYsIs 439,442 (2004).
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ease, stroke, gallbladder disease, osteoarthritis, sleep apnea, and endo-
metrial, breast, and colon cancers.'° The bottom hne is that dietary choices
matter.
Since people can generally choose which foods to consume, it is
easy to assert that a person can avoid adverse health consequences simply
by eating a healthy diet. While this statement is attractive in theory, in
practice, the theory cannot hold. The theory fails in this instance because
dietary choices are not made in a vacuum. Some Americans are fortunate
enough to live near a grocery store that stocks a wide variety of healthy
foods and an extensive selection of fresh produce products. However,
many Americans have more limited access to food.
The young mother in the vignette at the beginning of this Article
did not have a single quality grocery store in her neighborhood. There-
fore, she was restricted to her neighborhood grocery store. Unfortunately,
that store's selection and quality of food was sub-standard. Thus, the
young mother's choices are to: 1) spend precious money and time (if any)
on travel to a better store; or 2) purchase the inferior food offered in her
neighborhood. Any true choice exists only in theory. In practice, true
food choice is restricted to those fortunate enough to be in close prox-
imity to it.
The dilemma of the young mother at the beginning of the Article is
an everyday reality for the American poor. Studies have shown that poor
persons, particularly poor persons of color in inner cities, confront three
problems in acquiring food: 1) there are no grocery stores in their
neighborhoods; 2) the grocery stores that are located there have an infe-
rior selection; and 3) the inner city stores charge higher prices for food
than in suburban stores." While each of these three areas presents a special
concern, this Article will focus on the second problem-the disparity in
quality and selection in grocery stores in poor neighborhoods heavily
populated by non-whites versus those located in more affluent and less
racially diverse areas.
While much of the legal discussion on food has focused on the li-
ability of fast-food restaurants and junk-food manufacturers for the
growing obesity epidemic, the legal literature has not yet examined how
grocery stores-which remain the primary food source for most Ameri-
cans-contribute to the obesity epidemic and other health problems by
failing to provide a variety of healthy foods to customers in impoverished
neighborhoods of color. This Article argues that the law should prohibit
chain grocery stores' 2 that operate in more than one area of a city from
10. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Ovenveight and Obesity: Defining
Overweight and Obesity, http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity (last visited July 8,
2008).
11. Each of these problems will be explained in greater depth in Part I, infra.
12. The foregoing terms should be defined for clarity.The industry definitions are as
follows: A grocery store is "[a]ny retail store selling a line of dry grocery, canned goods, or
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providing a high level of service in one area and a lower level of quality
and service in another-particularly when the area receiving the lesser
service is more likely to be populated by poor, non-whites.
This Article will proceed in three parts. Part I will demonstrate that
chain grocery stores in poor areas do not make healthy foods available, or
that when they are available, they are of poor quality. Part II will explain
why current law is not very useful in combating this problem. Part III will
proffer solutions to the problems at hand. Part II-A will examine ap-
proaches that might be taken by the Legislative branch to rectify this
disparity. Part IV will summarize the conclusions and recommendations.
I.THE PROBLEM
To be certain, the legal literature has discussed how the law might
be used to address the problem of obesity. However, the literature has
scarcely, if ever, mentioned the relationship between grocery stores and
obesity.13 While some articles briefly mention the disparity in service, i4 only
nonfood items plus some perishable items." Food Marketing Institute, Facts & Figures: Key
Facts, Number of Stores, http://www.fini.org/facts -figsl?fuseaction=superfact (last visited
July 8, 2008). A "supermarket" is "[a]ny full-line self-service grocery store generating a
sales volume of $2 million or more annually." Id. A "chain" is "[a]n operator of 11 or more
retail stores." Id. Despite the formal definitions, to increase readability, the terms "grocery
store" and "supermarket" will be used interchangeably. However, when either term is used,
the assumption throughout the article should be that the discussion concerns chain su-
permarkets.
13. Some of the articles referencing obesity are: Jess Alderman, et al., Application of
Law to the Childhood Obesity Epidemic, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHics 90 (2007); Maurice Ashe, et
al., Local Venues for Change: Legal Strategies for Healthy Environments, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHics
138 (2007); Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 51 EMoRY
L.J. 1645 (2004); David Burnett, Fast Food Lawsuits and the Cheeseburger Bill: Critiquing
Congress'sResponse to the Obesity Epidemic, 14 VA.J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 357 (2007); Ellen Fried
& Michele Simon, The Competitive Food Conundrum: Can Government Regulations Improve
School Food?, 56 DuKE L.J. 1491 (2007); Guadalupe T. Luna, The New Deal and Food Insecu-
rity in the 'Midst of Plenty', 9 DRAKE J. AGRiC. L. 213 (2004); Joseph P. McMenamin &
Andrea D.Tiglio, Not the Next Tobacco: Defenses to Obesity Claims, 61 FOOD & DRUG UJ. 445
(2006); P.K. Newby, Are Dietary Intakes and Eating Behaviors Related to Childhood Obesity? A
Comprehensive Review of the Evidence, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHics 35 (2007); Wendy Collins
Perdue, et al., Legal Frameworks for Preventing Chronic Disease, 33 J.L. MED. & ETIcs 94
(Special Supp. 2005); David G. Yosifon, Legal Theoretic Inadequacy and Obesity Epidemic
Analysis, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 681 (2008).
14. See, e.g., john a. powell, Structural Racism: Building upon the Insights of.John Calmore,
86 N.C. L. Rxv. 791,801,806 (2008) (noting briefly that "parents shop at grocery stores with
overpriced and low-quality food" and have "limited access to adequate grocery stores" but
focusing primarily on how this is a result of structural racism with no mention of how gro-
cery stores might be remedied); David Dante Trout, Ghettoes Made Easy: The
Metamarket/AntiMarket Dichotomy and the Legal Challenges of Inner-City Economic Development,
35 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 427,473 (2000) (noting as part of a general overview of land use
theory that "ghetto supermarkets ... consistently sell poor quality goods at such high prices
that ghetto consumers will conduct elaborate schemes to reach supermarkets in middle class
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two articles have mentioned solutions, and even then, only in passing. For
instance, the article Fighting Childhood Obesity through Performance-Based
Regulation of the Food Industry lists ten solutions that the authors call
"command and control" theories for dealing with the obesity epidemic,
such as subsidizing grocery stores to enable them to sell fruits and vegeta-
bles . ' However, they ultimately reject the "command and control"
solutions in favor of "performance-based regulation," which relies less on
government intervention.16 Hence, the focus of the article is holding mer-
chants accountable for selling "bad" foods to children, and does not
directly address methods that would ensure that inner city residents re-
ceive the same quality and selection as their suburban counterparts. 7 The
second article, The Fat Fight, clearly notes that "[s]upermarkets in low-
income and minority areas also have less fresh fruits and vegetables than
supermarkets in wealthier and primarily white neighborhoods." 8 How-
ever, this is a general comparison and does not focus on comparing stores
in the same chain. Moreover, the article suggests that the federal govern-
ment use its spending powers to promote the use of fruits and vegetables
in inner city markets, but the three-paragraph proposal is vague and does
not focus on the problem of intra-chain discrimination. 19
A similar gap exists in the discrimination literature. Much has been
written about the discrimination African Americans and Latinos face indalylf i aea ncuin 20 221
daily life in areas including banking, environmental issues,21 health care,
areas," but providing no central focus on the grocery store issue); Sayward Byrd, Comment,
Civil Rights and the "Twinkie" Tax: The 900-Pound Gorilla in the War on Obesity, 65 LA. L. REV.
303 (2004); Andrea Freeman, Comment, Fast Food: Oppression through Poor Nutrition, 95 Cal.
L. Rev. 2221, 2240 (2007) (noting that local inner city grocery stores cannot afford to stock
fresh fruits and vegetables, but focusing primarily on fast food).
15. Stephen D. Sugarman & Nirit Sandman, Fighting Childhood Obesity through Per-
formance-Based Regulation of the Food Industry, 56 DuKE L.J. 1403, 1410 & n.25 (2007).
16. See id.
17. Id. at 1410 n. 25 & 1439-43. The article mentions subsidizing grocery stores in
low income areas. However, after the brief mention, the bulk of the article focuses on
assigning businesses a share of the blame for selling junk food to children. Moreover, the
subsidy proposal is focused on corner stores and convenience stores, not grocery stores.
18. Kelli K. Garcia, The Fat Fight: The Risks and Consequences of the Federal Govern-
ment's Failing Public Health Program, 112 PENN ST. L. REv. 529, 540 (2007).
19. Id. at 577 (mentioning the encouragement of fruit and vegetable consumption
in inner cities but not focusing on chain stores as "chains avoid the inner city").
20. See, e.g., Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON RaG. 121 (2004); Creola
Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending, 87 MINN L. REv. 1 (2002).
21. See, e.g., Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Dis-
proportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383 (1994); Julie Hurwitz & E.
Quita Sullivan, Using Civil Rights Laws to Challenge Environmental Racism, 2 J. L. SociErY 5
(2001).
22. Vernellia R. Randall, Eliminating Racial Discrimination in Health Care: A Call for
State Health Care Anti-Discrimination Law, 10 DEPAUtJ. HEALTH CARE L. 1 (2006).
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municipal services,23  public transportation,24  shopping,25  and taxicab
service. 26 However, the discrimination discourse has not yet focused on
the disparate treatment that chain grocery stores inflict upon their inner
city customers on a daily basis.
Thus, there is no article that focuses squarely on the problem of inade-
quate service and quality in inner city stores and offers concrete solutions to
those problems.This Article should help ignite the conversation.
This section will briefly summarize the problem addressed in this
Article. Subsection A will provide a quick overview of the American obe-
sity epidemic. Subsection B will examine the problems that African
Americans, Latinos and others face when attempting to purchase food,
with particular focus on the issues of inadequate selection and quality at
supermarkets.
23. See Mary J. Cavins, Annotations, Discrimination in Provision of Municipal Services or
Facilities as Civil Rights Violation, 51 A.L.R.3d 950 (1973).
24. See, e.g., Richard A. Marcantonio & Angelia K. Jongco, From the Back of the Bus
to the End of the Line: The Discriminatory Funding of Public Transit in California, 34 HUM. RTS.
Q. 10 (2007); Sean B. Seymore, Set the Captives Free! Transit Inequity in Urban Centers, and
the Laws and Policies which Aggravate the Disparity, 16 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 57
(2005).
25. See, e.g., Regina Austin, A 'Nation of Thieves': Securing Black People's Right to Shop
and Sell in White America, 1994 UTAHL. REV. 147 (1994); Claudine Colunbres, Targeting
Retail Discrimination with Parens Patriae, 36 COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 209 (2003);James P.
Nehf, Effective Regulation of Rent to Own Contracts, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 751 (1991); Desiree A.
Kennedy, Processing Civil Rights Summary Judgment and Consumer Discrimination Claims, 53
DEPAULL. REV. 989 (2004); Desiree A. Kennedy, Consumer Discrimination: The Limitations of
Federal Civil Rights Protection, 66 Mo. L. REv. 275 (2001); Matt Graves, Note, Purchasing
While Black: How Courts Condone Discrimination in the Marketplace, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L.
159 (2001).
26. See, e.g., Loren Paige Ambinder, Note, Dispelling the Myth of Rationality: Racial
Discrimination in Taxicab Service and the Efficacy of Litigation under 42 US.C. 5 1981, 64 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 342 (1996); Danita L. Davis, Note, Taxi! Why Hailing a New Idea about Public
Accommodation Laws may be Easier than Hailing a Taxi, 37 V.. U. L. REv. 929 (2003);Timo-
thy Sandefur, Can You Get Therefrom Here? How the Law Still Threatens King's Dream, 22
LAW & INEQ. 1 (2004).
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A. The Obesity Epidemic
1. America's Obesity Problem
America is currently in the throes of an obesity epidemic. 7 Amer-
ica's struggle with weight is not a new one. The trend toward expanding
waist-lines was noted as early as the mid-1970s. s However, the problem
gained widespread attention in the early 1990s as Americans became in-
creasingly overweight.29 While only 10.4 % of men and 14.9 % of women
were considered obese in the period from 1960-62, those numbers
roughly doubled to 19.9% and 25.1% respectively, by 1994.0 The most
recent statistics indicate that 66.3% of the American population is obese
or overweight. 31
Although the current obesity trends are disconcerting, more trou-
bling is the fact there is no relief on the horizon. The number of
overweight and obese people in has risen, rather than declined, in recent
years. 2 Even more disturbing is the fact the number of obese people in
America has steadily increased over this period as well.3 3 From 1971 to
2004, the rate of overweight children aged 2-5 nearly tripled from five
percent to 13.9%.34 This trend is particularly troubling because an increase
in childhood obesity predicts even higher increases in future adult obesity
rates, as obese children are more likely to grow into overweight and obese
adults.3'
27. Obesity can be defined in many ways, but is most commonly defined using the
body mass index or "BMI" standard, which is calculated using a person's weight and
height. Centers for Disease Control, Overweight and Obesity, BMI-Introduction, http://
www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity (last visited July 8, 2008). Obese adults have a BMI
of more than 30. Overweight is defined as a BMI between 25-29. Centers for Disease
Control, Overweight and Obesity: Defining Overweight and Obesity, http://www.cdc.gov/
nccdphp/dnpa/obesity (last visited July 8, 2008).
28. Shiriki Kumanyika, Minisymposium on Obesity: Overview and Some Strategic Con-
siderations, 22 ANr. REV. PuB. HEALTh 293,294 (2001).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Centers for Disease Control, NCHS Health E Stats, Table 1, http://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/products/pubs/pubd/hestats/owerweight/overwghtadult_03.htm. (last visited July
8, 2008) [hereinafter NCHS Health E Stats].
32. Id. at Table 2.
33. Kumanyika, supra note 28, at 295.
34. NCHS Health E Stats, supra note 31.
35. Kumanyika, supra note 28, at 295; Karen Cullen et al., Food Category Purchases
Vary by Household Education and Race/Ethnicity: Results from Grocery Receipts, 107 J. Am.
DET. Assoc. 1747, 1747 (2007) ("Overweight youth are likely to remain overweight as
adults .... ").
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2.The Causes
Having considered the extent of the overweight and obesity prob-
lem, the causes of the phenomenon must be considered. The most
obvious cause is "an imbalance between energy intake and energy expen-
diture." 36 In plain English, individuals are taking in more calories (through
food) than they are using (through activity and exercise). Hence, many of
the causes of obesity "operate at the level of individual lifestyle choices.,
37
However, the public health literature acknowledges that while individual
choices do play a role, the causes of obesity are "multifactoral," and in-
38dude genetics and the local environment.
One of the most studied aspects of the local environment has been
the food resource environment. This environment includes the number
and type of food stores in a neighborhood, as well as the variety, types,
and quality of foods available in those stores. 39 The studies note that "[b]y
ignoring the food environment, nutrition education programs designed to
encourage healthier eating habits may be ineffectual, not because con-
sumers are unresponsive to educational efforts, but because the food
environment creates extra barriers to their adoption."40 The research pro-
vides "increasing evidence that neighborhood resources condition those
[food] choices. 41 One article states that "variations in access to healthy
36. Maida Galvez et al., Race and Food Store Availability in an Inner-City Neighborhood,
11 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 624,624 (2008).
37. Sanae Inagami et al., You Are Mhere You Shop: Grocery Store Locations, Weight, and
Neighborhoods, 31 AM.J. PREV. MED. 10, 10 (2006).
38. Elizabeth Baker, The Role of Race and Poverty in Access to Foods that Enable Indi-
viduals to Adhere to Dietary Guidelines, 3 Preventing Chronic Disease 1 (2006), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2006/jul/05_0217.htm. See also Kimberly Morland et
al., Supermarkets, Other Food Stores, and Obesity: The Atherosclerosis Risk in Communities Study,
30 AM. J. PREV. MED. 333, 333 (2006) ("The high prevalence of obesity results from the
interaction of environmental, behavioral, and genetic factors. Although genetic factors are
important ... the contextual effect of residential areas create the context for the popula-
tion distribution of adiposity.").
39. See Simone French et al., Environmental Influences on Eating and Physical Activity,
22 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 309, 309-10 (2001) (noting that "eating-related" environ-
mental influences include "trends in the food supply and eating away from home; food
advertising, promotion, and education; and food pricing."); Kimberly Morland et al., The
Contextual Effect of the Local Food Environment on Residents' Diets: The Atherosclerosis Risk in
Communities Study, 92 AM.J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1761, 1762 (noting that places considered as
part of the food environment are, inter alia, "supermarkets, grocery stores, convenience
stores, and specialty food stores.").
40. Karen Jetter & Diana Cassady, The Availability and Cost of Healthier Food Alterna-
tives, 30 Am.J. OF PREVENTIVE MED. 38,43 (2006).
41. Inagami, supra note 37,at 10. See also Baker, supra note 38, at 2 ("[R]esearchers
have suggested that the ability to make healthy choices is influenced not only by the loca-
tion of the food outlet but also by the selection of items in the outlet."); id. at 7 ("[l~t may
not be the location of the food outlets but the selection of food in the outlets that is asso-
ciated with the ability to meet recommendations on dietary intake."); LaVona Blair Lewis
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foods have been demonstrated to influence observed food choices ... The
food options available at these [markets] almost certainly influence peo-
ple's choices of what they consume on a day to day basis.
4 2
The point on "choice" is critical. Conventional wisdom states that
food purchasers are free to choose among a variety of foods. Indeed, one
article has noted:
The basis of the obesity defense is that the consumers are free
to choose and are capable of saying no ... The key argument is
that everyone has personal responsibility for his or her eating
habits and is free to choose among the available foods.The no-
tion of freedom to choose is codified in expert panel and
agency reports that exhort the public to "choose" healthy as
opposed to unhealthy foods.43
However, this view overlooks the fact that choices in the food con-
text, as choices in other areas of life, operate under constraints. Indeed, it
has been noted that while "[flood is arguably the most critical 'thing that
promotes health' ... in urban areas food choice is often severely con-
strained' 44 While "[1]attitude in personal choices related to eating and
physical activity tends to be greatest among the socially advantaged' 45 the
converse is also true. The disadvantaged struggle to find and afford healthy
foods. Indeed, it has been noted that "foods recommended by health au-
thorities are sometimes more expensive and less available in poor areas.
' 6
If the food environment influences food choice, the components of
the food environment must be examined. While people obtain food from
numerous sources, "[t]he presence of food stores, and the availability of
healthful products in those stores, appear to be important contributors to
healthy eating patterns among neighborhood residents., 47 Furthermore,
"[t]he spatial accessibility of supermarkets and the availability, selection,
quality, and price of foods at retail outlets are important components of
et al., African Americans'Access to Healthy Food Options in South Los Angeles Restaurants, 95
AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 668, 668 ("[W]hen nutritional resources are limited ... the environ-
ment makes it more difficult for residents to sustain any effort to eat a healthy diet.");
Adam Drewnowski & Nicole Darmon, Food Choices and Diet Costs: an Economic Analysis,
135 JOURNAL OF NUTRITION 900, 900 (2005) ("Rising obesity rates have long been linked
to the food environment.").
42. David C. Sloane et al., Improving the Nutritional Resource Environment For Healthy
Living, 18J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 568, 569 (2003).
43. Drewnowski & Darmon, supra note 41, at 903.
44. Eisenhauer, supra note 5, at 125.
45. Kumanyika, supra note 28, at 299.
46. Morland, supra note 39, at 1761; See also Karen Glanz, Nutrition Environment
Measures Survey in Stores (NEMS-S), 32 AM.J. Ps.Ev. MED. 282,287 (2007) ("Previous stud-
ies have shown healthful foods are less available in low-income or minority
neighborhoods.").
47. Glanz, supra note 46, at 282.
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community food security. Finally, supermarkets are a primary source of
food. Nearly sixty percent of all of the dollars spent on foods to be con-
sumed at home are spent at supermarkets. 9 Moreover, in 2007, chain
supermarkets accounted for nearly eighty-two percent of all grocery
stores. 0 Thus, any serious discussion of combating obesity in America
must discuss the impact that grocery stores have on the foods available for
consumption. Since grocery stores provide such a significant portion of
the food Americans consume, if Americans are to eat healthier diets, gro-
cery stores must provide healthy options for purchase.
B. How Grocery Stores Complicate the Problem of "Choice"
As previously stated, it would be easy for one to argue that the rela-
tionship between grocery stores and obesity is overstated. The argument
could be structured as follows: "A person entering a grocery store is not
forced to buy particular items. A person can buy apples or apple pie, rice
cakes or cupcakes, baked chicken or fried chicken." This logic may seem
attractive because in the abstract, people do have the ability to choose the
foods that they consume. However, this theory assumes that all persons
have access to the same foods.
The poor-in particular poor African Americans and Latinos resid-
ing in America's inner cities-are not equally situated when it comes to
food access. "Communities with higher proportions of African Americans
have ... fewer supermarkets and may have more expensive and lower-
quality foods for sale.'' Similarly, "neighborhoods with large black popu-
lations will also find, on average, higher prices, and sizes, dirtier stores, and
worse quality of fresh products. ' s2 Finally, "[w]ealthier neighborhoods
have more high-quality grocery stores per capita, with fresh fruits and
vegetables available in greater variety. In contrast, poorer urban ... areas
may have few or no grocery stores with poorer quality foods and limited
selection of produce.""3 Thus, poor persons of color face three major
48. Shannon N. Zenk et al., Fruit and Vegetable Access Differs by Community Racial
Composition and Socioeconomic Position in Detroit, Michigan, 16 EHNICrrY & DIsEASE 275,
275 (2006).
49. ERS/USDA Briefing Room-Food Marketing System in the U.S.: Food
Retailing, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/FoodMarketingSystem/foodretailing .htm
(click "Download an excel file" under "Foodstore sales by segment, 2005.") (last visited Jul.
8,2008).
50. Food Marketing Institute, Facts & Figures: Key Facts, Number of Stores, http://
www.fimi.org/facts fig/keyfacts/?fu seaction=stores (last visited Jul. 8, 2008).
51. Zenk et al., supra note 48, at 275.
52. Bruce F Hall, Neighborhood Difference in Retail Food Stores: Income versus Race and
Age of Population, 59 EcoN. CEO. 282,294 (1983).
53. Adam Drewnowski & Anne Barratt-Fornell, Do Healthier Diets Cost More?, 39
NUTRITION TODAY 161,166-67 (2004).
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problems in obtaining food: 1) a lack of stores in their neighborhoods;
2) higher prices; and 3) a narrower selection of inferior goods when stores
are present. This Article will focus on the third problem.
This Article presupposes that when a grocery chain decides to locate
in a low income area, that decision triggers an obligation to provide the
same basic selection of goods and the same quality of goods and services
in that area as it would in any other area. Thus, that problem is the focus
of this Article.
1. Exploration of Studies
This section will examine studies comparing the quality and selec-
tion of foods at chain stores in inner cities to chain stores in other areas.
While these studies are not yet numerous, their impact is undeniable. The
goal of this discussion is two-fold: 1) to demonstrate the existence of is-
sues with respect to the availability; and 2) to demonstrate that the
problem is not isolated to one city or one part of the country.
a. Washington, DC and San Francisco
The problems of inequality in food access and food quality are not
new. A 1969 Congressional Report by the Committee on Government
Affairs outlined the problems experienced by shoppers at chain grocery
stores in Washington, D.C. and San Francisco.54 The report began by not-
ing that consumers in "low-income, inner-city areas are frequently sold
lower quality merchandise."" The report discussed the availability of ad-
vertised items, as well as the quality of the items provided.
With respect to availability, the study found that many advertised
items were not available in inner city chain grocery stores. The report be-
gan by noting that when all of the chain stores in San Francisco were
combined, an average of six percent of the advertised items were not
found on the shelves. 6 The report continued to note that when the results
were analyzed by location and income, it was clear that "[c]onsiderably
more items were unavailable in low income areas.-5 7 In San Francisco,
poorer consumers were two percent less likely to find advertised items
than their counterparts in wealthier areas.58
54. Staff of H. Comm. On Govt. Operations, 91st Cong., Economic Report on
Food Chain Selling Practices in the District of Columbia and San Francisco (1969) [here-
inafter Food Chain Selling Practices].
55. Id. at 3.
56. Id. at 6, 29.
57. Id. at 30.
58. Id. at 30.
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The difference in Washington, D.C. was more stark. "For all chain-
stores surveyed in Washington, 14 percent of items advertised were
unavailable." '9 When availability in higher income areas was compared to
that in lower income neighborhoods, a large disparity was apparent. While
the stores in Washington, D.C.'s wealthier neighborhoods experienced
only eleven percent unavailability, stores in the poorer areas were missing
twenty-three percent of the advertised items.60
In addition to availability, the report examined the quality of the
merchandise offered by the stores in various areas of each city. The study
began by noting that prior studies conducted by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics and the USDA, "contain[ed] some indication that quality may be
inferior in low-income stores. 61 In its own study, the Committee found
that "hardly any 'prime' meats are sent to low-income area stores. 6 2 In
addition, "[a] little over ten percent of the meat products surveyed in the
lower income stores were reported as having a "fair" or "poor" appear-
ance. In higher income area stores this finding was reported for about
seven percent of the items surveyed. 63 Despite these findings, the Com-
mittee was reluctant to contribute any lack of quality to malfeasance by
the store chains, choosing instead to focus on consumer preferences and
64patterns and poor store management as an explanation.
With respect to produce, the Committee noted that "some crates of
premium quality produce might be sent mainly to high-income areas. 65
However, the Committee declined to find this action was a result of dis-
crimination by the stores.66
In summary, the beginnings of a problem with supermarket avail-
ability and quality were outlined as early as 1969. Since that time, the
problems have become more stark, and the literature has expanded to re-
flect the continuing disparities.
59. Id. at 6,29.
60. Id. at 30.
61. Id. at 37. The prior studies had noted that while only two percent of high-
income areas had meat with excessive fat content, seven percent of the lower-income
stores carried that product. Moreover, while seven percent of the produce in the higher
income areas studied was considered poor, that number increased to ten percent in the
lower income areas. Id.
62. Id. at 37.
63. Id. at 38.
64. Id. at 38-39.
65. Id. at 38.
66. Id.
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b.Augusta, GA
A 2003 study compared six stores in Augusta, Georgia-three stores
each from two different grocery chains.67 Then, the three stores from each
chain were divided into three socio-economic status (SES) groups based
on available census data.68 For each chain, the study included one store in
a high income neighborhood, one store in a middle income neighbor-
hood, and one store in a low income neighborhood for each of the two
chains. 69 The census data conclusively showed that the low-income
neighborhoods had a higher concentration of non-white residents.70 The
low-income census tracts had minority populations of 59% and 89%,
whereas the high-income census tracks claimed fewer than 20% minority
residents. 1
The researchers asked the study participants to evaluate strawberries,
71bananas, and green grapes purchased at each of the stores for appearance
and taste on a nine-point scale, with 1 being "extremely rotten" and 9
being "extremely fresh. '73 The researchers devised a blind study, so the
evaluators were not told beforehand which produce originated from
which stores.74
For appearance, the high-income stores received an average score of
4.74.7' The appearance of the food at the medium-income stores was
rated 3.30.76 The low-income stores received the lowest score, 2.46. 7 The
results were similar for the taste of the food.78 The food from the high-
income stores received a 4.50, the highest scores for taste.7 9 The middle-
income stores received a 3.47.80 The low-income stores again fell into last
place, scoring only 2.53.1
67. Richard Topolski et al., Grapes of Wrath: Discrimination in the Produce Aisle, 3
ANALYSES OF SOCIAL ISSUES AND PUB. POL'Y 111, 113-14 (2003).The authors did not iden-
tify the chains that were visited during the study.
68. Id. at 113.
69. Id. at 113-14.
70. See id. at 114.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 113. While this study focused solely on fruit, the authors "believe[d] that
the results could easily be extended to other forms of perishable foods." Id. at 116-17.
73. Id. at 114.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 115.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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While these quantitative data clearly demonstrate that the appear-
ance and taste of the food increases as the income level increases, - the
qualitative reports from the study also bolster this conclusion. The Augusta
study revealed that the participants often declined to taste the produce
from the low-income markets.83 In fact, three participants so flatly refused
to taste the food from the low-income markets that those foods had to be
dropped from the study.84 The fact that some of the participants deemed
the subject food unfit for consumption speaks volumes about what the
poor encounter in grocery stores on a regular basis.
Finally, the Augusta study connected the lack of healthful food op-
tions to the diet and health of poor, non-white Americans. The study
stated that while federal guidelines recommend two or more servings of
fresh fruit daily, "African Americans are less likely to meet this guideline
on a consistent basis than Caucasians .. .The scarcity of adequate fresh
fruit options may be one of the factors influencing this disparity. 8 5 The
authors further noted that the absence of options was not without conse-
quence. They stated:
In the absence of fewer quality perishable goods, such indi-
viduals may resort to purchasing nutritionally inferior grocery
items such as processed or junk foods ... As a result, they will
have reduced intake of vitamins and minerals considered essen-
tial for a maximally healthy development. In addition to the
personal cost to these individuals, there exists a potential for the
incursion of long-term societal costs in areas such as health care and
education.
8 6
Thus, when adequate food is not provided equally across the nation, there
is a possibility that we will all pay the price.
c. Detroit
The Detroit News studied the issue of grocery stores in that city as
part of its 2001 "Left Behind" series on poverty in the city. 7 The series
82. Id. at 116. The authors stated, "[c]onsistent with our hypothesis, the results indi-
cate that participants rated produce from supermarkets in low SES neighborhoods as both
appearing and tasting less fresh than their counterparts in high SES neighborhood super-
markets." Id.
83. Id. at 116.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 118.
86. Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
87. Gregg Krupa, Groceries Cost more for Poor, DErROrr NEws, Aug. 21, 2001, available at
http://www.detnews.com/special reports/2001 /poverty/821lead/82 l1ead.htm (last visited
July 19,2007).
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began by noting the dearth of grocery stores in the areas.88 However, it
continued to state, "It is not just a question of proximity and price, but
also choice and selection ... Inner-city stores tend to get the bottom of
the range of vegetables and meat.' 89 The article continues on to state:
A frequent complaint of grocery shoppers in poorer areas is
that produce is of poor quality. There was also some evidence
[of] that at the Farmer Jack on Joseph Campau [an inner city
grocery store], where much of the corn and all of the water-
melon was far browner than the same produce at the two
Farmer Jacks in Macomb County [a suburban area], on previ-
ous days.9
Thus, the Detroit report also demonstrates that the problem is one that
goes beyond any one city or section of the country.
d. New York, New York
In April 1991, the Department of Consumer Affairs for the City of
New York commissioned a report entitled, "The Poor Pay More ... for
Less." Part I of the report studied the problems faced by poor in attempt-
ing to shop for groceries.9' The agency studied the availability of stores,
92the price differentials, and most important, the quality of the groceries.
The study concluded that the selection and quality of the goods in the
inner city was inferior to that in the suburbs. To wit:
Less expensive (and more fatty) bacon is sold instead of the
brands seen at supermarkets elsewhere. Fresh produce is espe-
cially limited, often with fresh vegetables such as spinach
unavailable. The fresh produce that is displayed is, we found,
often not fresh; lettuce is commonly wilted, carrots and celery
rubbery, broccoli yellowed, if there is any at all 3
The study then compared the differences between the goods that were
sold at the stores.The study conducted a "special comparison" between an
A&P market in Greenwich Village to a similarly sized A&P market in
Harlem. 94 The researchers found that the Harlem store had more canned
88. See id.
89. Id. (quoting Peter K. Eisenger, Wayne State University Professor and author of
TowARD AN END Or HUNGER IN AMERICA).
90. Id.
91. NewYork Dep't of Consumer Affairs, The Poor Pay More ... for Less, Part 1: Gro-
cery Shopping (April 1991) [hereinafter Poor Pay More].
92. Id. at 27.
93. Id. at 28.
94. Id.
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goods, more snack foods, and more candy.9 In fact, the Harlem store had
candy in each checkout aisle, compared to only two aisles in the Green-
wich store. 96 The Greenwich Village store had a "wide selection" of breads,
including several types of wheat breads, while the Harlem store with a
"smaller selection" was noted to have possibly only one brand of whole
97
wheat bread. Moreover, while the Greenwich store had an "ample" sup-
ply of alternative milks-e.g., soy milks-the Harlem store had a "smaller"
supply.9
In addition, the Harlem store had fewer types of produce available.
While the Greenwich Village store had four types of apples and three types
of grapes, the Harlem store had one less variety of each fruit.99 In addition,
the Harlem store did not have eggplant, snow peas, corn, or celery, and had
fewer kinds of lettuce.1°° With respect to meat, the Harlem store empha-
sized pork and had a "small" chicken selection, compared to the "large"
chicken selection in Greenwich Village. ° Moreover, unlike the Green-
wich store, the Harlem store had no fresh fish. 
2
e. Summary
The foregoing studies demonstrate three things quite clearly. First,
when shopping for food, poor persons in the inner cities face a disparity
in selection. The supermarkets in their neighborhoods do not carry the
same products as their suburban counterparts, even though both are part
of the same chain. Second, when perishable products are carried, the
products in the inner city grocery stores are inferior to those that are sold
in more affluent, more racially homogenous areas even though stores in
both neighborhoods are part of the same chain. Finally, these studies come
from San Francisco, California, Washington, D.C., Augusta, Georgia,
Detroit, Michigan, and New York, New York. These are cities of varying
sizes, ethnicities, and geographical regions. When these studies are taken
together, it cannot be argued that this is a local or regional problem con-
fined to one city or one part of the country. Rather, the fact that similar
results were obtained in quite different areas of the country demonstrates
that this is a national, rather than a local problem.
95. Id. at xix app. d.
96. Id.
97. Id. Please note that "possibly" is used because the researchers did not consis-
tently record whether the bread was white or wheat, but where noted, the Greenwich
store is clearly at an advantage.
98. Id.
99. Id. at xix-xx.
100. Id. at xx.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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2. Rebuttals
While the facts and figures put forth in the foregoing section paint a
compelling picture, some may be wary of holding chain stores responsible
for current disparity for a variety of reasons. However, these criticisms can
be refuted.
First, critics may assert that stores, as businesses, have no obligation
to stock products that will not sell. The reasoning goes, "If people won't
eat these foods, stores shouldn't stock them and let them go to waste."
However, there is little, if any, evidence that the poor care less about what
they eat than other groups. One study noted that "fruits and vegetables
were consistently the most frequently offered definition of healthful eat-
ing regardless of income or race."13 Thus, the poor do desire healthy food
options.104 Moreover, lower income shoppers desperately want healthy
foods in their neighborhoods. One Minnesota study provided the follow-
ing first person accounts:
See, my thing is fruits and vegetables. I don't care if I have
meat or not, that's not the issue for me, okay, so I would
probably want a big drive of fresh, I'm talking about all kinds
of lettuce, not just your normal iceberg. I want variety. I want
the variety of foods that I like. I like guavas. I like pineapples. I
like kiwi, mango ... I want variety. That's what I would have
"I really like to have organic produce or whatever ... there's
nothing like that around here ....
"I want to see fresher fruits and vegetables and more choices in
the stores because they're limited in the stores as to what you
can buy." 10
Therefore, it simply cannot be said that poorer people do not care for
healthier foods.
103. Nicole Eikenberry & Cheryl Smith, Healthful Eating: Perceptions, Motivations,
Barriers, and Promoters in Low-income Minnesota Communities, 104 J. Am. DIET. Assoc. 1158,
1160 (2004).
104. Indeed, an older government study showed that both food stamp recipients and
those not receiving food stamps spent roughly the same amount-less than two percent of
the grocery bill-on green vegetables. See Paul E. Nelson, Economics, Statistics, and Co-
operatives Service, U.S. Dep't of Agric., Do Food Stamp and Other Customers Buy the Same
Products in Supermarkets?, Agric. Econ. Report No. 421 (March 1979), available at http://
naldr.nal.usda.gov/NALWeb/AgricolaLink.asp?Accession=CAT87202104 (last visited
Aug. 13, 2008).
105. Deja Hendrickson et al., Fruit and Vegetable Access in Four Low-income Food Deserts
Communities in Minnesota, 23 J. AGRic. & HUMAN VALuEs, 371,377 (2006).
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Second, merely assuming that the poor do not like healthier items
because these items sometimes fail to sell at inner city stores neglects an
important reality. When foods are not available in low income neighbor-
hoods, the poor will often travel to stores outside of their
neighborhoods.' 6 Thus, at present, it is almost impossible to know
whether these items would sell well at these stores or not. So, this is a clas-
sic "chicken or egg?" situation. Since stores in poor neighborhoods
currently do not stock a variety of fresh items, this question cannot be
satisfactorily answered until the chain stores provide the same selection
and quality of food in all neighborhoods.
Third, there is an argument that cultural norms must be respected.
For example, the vice president of a New York City grocery store chain
was quoted as saying, "Supermarkets sell what the customer wants. If their
ethnic background is such that they buy sweets, that's what you have to
sell. For example, Hispanics drink sweet sugary sodas, and that's what you
have to sell." 107 Studies have shown that different cultures have different
norms when it comes to food. 8 However, cultural differences do not
necessarily translate into a total lack of concern about healthy eating. In-
deed, one study demonstrated that while African Americans have a rich
tradition of "soul food" foods that are generally fatty and high in calories
and sodium, African Americans were willing to change their practices
slightly-for instance, by substituting turkey for pork-to eat healthier
while preserving the cultural heritage.'0 9 Thus, any "cultural concerns"
should not be a barrier. Cultural practices and healthy eating from a well-
stocked grocery store can co-exist.
Finally, it may be said that stores, as businesses, should be most con-
cerned about the "bottom line," and not about the social ramifications of
their decisions. However, continued discrimination in this area is bad
business. A recent study in Madison, Wisconsin showed that African
American shoppers, though initially less familiar with organic produce,
were actually more open to the idea of buying organic than similarly situ-
ated Caucasian shoppers.110 The article ended by noting, "[I]f demand by
African Americans for organic food is indeed limited by access and famili-
arity, and the generally positive attitudes found in this study are
106. See Eikenberry, supra note 103, at 1160 (With participant noting the time and
cost associated with travelling to obtain the desired healthier foods).
107. See Poor Pay More, supra note 91, at 29 n. 35.
108. See, e.g., Collins Airhihenbuwa & Shiriki Kumanyika, Cultural Aspects of African
American Eating Patterns, 1 ETHNICIY AND HEALTH 245 (1996)(describing the unique Afri-
can American food traditions and habits).
109. Delores C.S. James, Factors Influencing Food Choices, Dietary Intake, and Nutrition-
Related Attitudes among African Americans: Application of a Culturally Sensitive Model, 9
ETHNICITY & HEALTH 349, 363 (2004).
110. Lydia Zepeda et al., Organic Food Demand: A Focus Group study Involving Cauca-
sian and African A merican Shoppers, 23 AG uc. & HUMAN VALuES 385,390-91 (2006).
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widespread, African Americans could represent a potential market for or-
ganic foods.' ' 1'
Moreover, "[s]ince all people require food on a daily basis and shop
for it frequently, food retailers should be recognized as far more than sim-
ply another retail establishment. Grocery stores, like any business, have
a duty to be good corporate citizens. This is especially true in an urban
environment where the residents are more limited in their shopping op-
tions. Therefore, chain supermarkets have a special responsibility to their
communities to not only serve them, but to serve them well.
3. Conclusion
In conclusion, the studies effectively show that residents of poorer
neighborhoods-who also happen to be predominately African American
and Latino-have less access to quality produce and healthy food items. As
a result, poor non-whites are less likely to eat a healthy diet and therefore,
more likely to encounter serious health problems related to diet, includ-
ing obesity and its sequelae. Therefore, grocery stores should be compelled
to provide similar selection and service in all neighborhoods that they
''3
serve.
111. Id. at 392.
112. Heather Stouder, Office of the Mayor, Madison Wisconsin, Grocery Stores in City
Neighborhoods: Supporting Access to Food Choices, Livable Neighborhoods, and Entrepreneurial
Opportunities in Madison, Wisconsin at 8 (May 2004), available at http://www.ci.madison.
wi.us/planning/Grocery%20Store.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2008).
113. It should be noted that the USDA has instituted a Farmer's Market Nutrition
Program (FMNP) to provide "fresh ... locally grown fruits and vegetables to WIC partici-
pants." See USDA, WIC Farmers' Market Nutrition Program (2008), available at http://
www.fns.usda.gov/wic/WIC-FMNP-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2008); see also 7
C.ER. § 248.1 (2009). However, this program is not sufficient to remedy the problems
outlined in this Article for at least three reasons. First, the FMNP is limited to WIC recipi-
ents, and not all persons affected by the disparity in selection and quality at stores
participate in WIC. Second, currently, the FMNP is offered only in "certain areas" of 46
participating states, and therefore is not a program that is available even to all WIC recipi-
ents. In fact, although there are nearly eight million WIC participants, only 2.5 million of
these participate in the FMNP. See USDA, WIC Farmers' Market Nutrition Program
(2008), available at http://www.ffis.usda.gov/wic/WIC-FMNP-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last visited
Aug. 13, 2008). Therefore, a large number of WIC participants would not be able to take
advantage of the FMNP. Finally, the FMNP, by its very nature, is a seasonal program. See
USDA, Wholesale and Farmers' Markets, http://www.ams.usda.gov, (follow "Wholesale
and Farmers Markets" hyperlink; then follow "USDA Farmers Market" (noting that the
USDA run Farmer's Market is open from June to October each year); see also Yolanda
Suarez-Balcazar et al., African Americans' Views on Access to Healhy Foods: What a Farmers'
Market Provides, 44 JouRNAL OF EXTENSION Article 2FEA2, available at http://www.joe.org/
joe/2006april/a2.shtml (last visited Sept. 5, 2008) (noting that farmers markets, while
helpful, are "not a year-round option"). Therefore, the FMNP would represent a helpful
resource for some, but surely not all, of the persons affected by the disparities discussed in
this Article.
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II. PROBLEMS UNDER EXISTING LAW
As will shortly be explained, our current legal framework is not
equipped to address the problem of unequal selection and quality at gro-
cery stores. Although a discussion of unworkable solutions may seem like
a detour, this Article proposes new legislation, and it would be irresponsi-
ble to propose a change in the law unless truly needed.
Subsection A will examine the possibility of an equal protection
claim. Subsection B will discuss the prospect of a fundamental rights
claim. Subsection C will explain why current federal civil rights statutes
are of little help. Finally, Subsection D will address the problems with
seeking recourse through current administrative remedies.
A. Is Equal Protection Applicable?
The Fourteenth Amendment states that "[n]o state shall ... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 1 4
When a classification affects a particular group with immutable racial,
ethnic, or religious characteristics, strict scrutiny is applied."' As the litera-
ture outlined in the previous section indicates, African Americans, Latinos,
and other communities of color are more likely to live in neighborhoods
that provide inadequate choice and quality of goods.1 6 Because race plays
a role, strict scrutiny analysis could be appropriate.
However, before the Fourteenth Amendment can be applied, any
potential plaintiff must make two showings. First, the plaintiff must dem-
onstrate that the unequal treatment was perpetuated by a state actor.
Second, for racial discrimination claims, equal protection analysis requires
a demonstration of discriminatory intent.1 1 7 Both requirements will now
be examined.
114. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
115. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (noting that "all legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group" should be subject to "the
most rigid scrutiny").
116. See supra Part IL.B.1.
117. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (noting that discriminatory
impact without discriminatory intent is insufficient under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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1. The State Action Problem
a. Grocery stores and the Government
The Food Stamp Program is a federal program which provides assis-
tance to needy families for food purchases.118 The federal government
funds the program by giving federal finds to state agencies, which then
determine whether applicants are eligible for benefits. " 9 The benefits are
provided to recipients in the form of vouchers or Electronic Benefits
Transfer cards.1 20 The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for
Women, Infants, and Children, commonly known as WIC, also provides
vouchers for specific food items to eligible participants.
121
These benefits can be redeemed at any authorized retail food
store. 122 To become an authorized retailer, a store must be approved by the
federal government. The retailers are subjected to what has been called
"extensive" regulation.1 23 There are approximately 200,000 authorized
Food Stamp retailers124 and 46,000 authorizedWIC retailers.
25
The role of chain supermarkets in these programs cannot be under-
stated. One study notes that although chain supermarkets comprised only
fifteen percent of authorized retailers in the Washington, D.C. area, that
group of stores was responsible for sixty percent of food stamp redemp-
tions.126 Nationally, chain stores account for the same percent of eligible
retailers, but seventy-seven percent of all redemptions.
118. See USDA, Quick Facts: Food Stamps, available at http://www.fns.usda.gov/
cga/FactSheets/FSPQuick_- Facts.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2008). After this Article was
written, the Food Stamp Program was renamed the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program. See USDA, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Home, http://
www.ffs.usda.gov/FSP/snap.htm (last visited April 24, 2009) (explaining reasons for
change and effective date of October 1, 2008). For convenience, the program will be re-
ferred to as the Food Stamp Program in this Article.
119. See id. (noting the division of responsibility between state and federal govern-
ment); see also 7 U.S.C.A. § 2020 (a) (2005) (allocating eligibility determinations to the
state government);JAMEs B.WADLEY, 5 WEST'S FED.ADMIN. PRc. § 5753 (4th ed. 2008).
120. SeeWadley, supra note 119, § 5753.
121. See USDA Food and Nutrition Service, Nutrition Program Facts: WIC, http://
www.fns.usda.gov/wic/WIC-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2008) [hereinafter
USDA Nutrition Program Facts].
122. See id.; See also Wadley, supra note 119, § 5753.
123. Wadley, supra note 119, § 5754.
124. USDA Food and Nutrition Service, Food Retailers in the Food Stamp Program:
Characteristics and Service to Program Participants i (Feb. 1997).
125. See USDA Food and Nutrition Service, WIC at a Glance, http://www.
fis.usda.gov/wic/aboutwic/wicataglance.htm (last visited March 6,2009).
126. See Margaret Andrews et al., USDA Econ. Research Serv., Using USDA's Thrifty
Food Plan to Assess Food Availability and Affordability, 24 FOOD REv. 45,48 (2001).
127. Id.
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b. The Law on State Action
It is well settled that the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to
state action.'2  Nevertheless, the Court has allowed private parties to be
subjected to the terms of the amendment under certain conditions. First,
the Court considers whether "the [challenged] deprivation ... [was]
caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or
by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the
State is responsible"; and second, whether "the party charged with the
deprivation . .. may fairly be said to be a state actor.' 29 The second prong
asks whether the private entity has "performed a public function; was cre-
ated, coerced, or encouraged by the government; or acted in a symbiotic
relationship with the government."' 30 The validity of the first prong has
been challenged. 3' Therefore, the analysis here will focus on the second
128. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) ("It is state action of a particular char-
acter that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of
the [Fourteenth] amendment.").
129. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922,936 (1982)
130. Brentwood Acad. V. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Assoc., 531 U.S. 288, 305
(Thomas, J., dissenting). The Brentwood decision was controversial as it attempted to add
another test to the existing list-"pervasive entwinement." See id. at 298. This was
controversial because, as the dissent stated, prior to Brentwood, the Court "ha[d] never
found state action based upon mere 'entwinement' and that the new test "lack[ed] any
support in our state-action jurisprudence. " Id. at 305, 312 (Thomas,J, dissenting). To date,
Brentwood is the only case in which the Court has employed the test. Moreover, the Court
did not state how much "entwinement" would be enough to generate a finding of state
action. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (3d ed.
2006).Therefore, this Article will focus on the tests that are clearly established.
131. For example:
The first prong doesn't seem meaningful. If I run somebody over in my car, I
am "exercising a privilege having its source in state authority," i.e., the
driver's license. But this doesn't shed any light on the state action issue. Why
should the resolution of that issue be in any way affected by the fact that I
was driving rather than walking?
Craig Bradley, Untying the State Action Knot, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 223, 237 (1996).
Professor Bradley continues to state that by contrast, the second prong will generally be
"dispositive of the state action issue." Id. Furthermore, in their treatise, Professors Rotunda
and Nowak state that the question posed in the prong "may well be of little practical im-
portance in deciding any state action case." JOHN E. NowAK AND RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SuBsTANCE & PROCEDURE 1000 (4th ed. 2007).
Even if the prong remains valid, it could present problems for plaintiffs attempting
to sue grocery chains. Again, the test requires an examination of "whether the claimed
constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its
source in state authority." Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F3d 1137, 1144 (3d Cir. 1995).
"In other words, we ask, under what authority did the private person engage in the alleg-
edly unlawful acts?" Id. As an example, the plaintiff in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163, 175 (1972), failed to meet the first prong because "the Pennsylvania Liquor Con-
trol Board play[ed] absolutely no part in establishing or enforcing the membership or
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prong.When grocery stores are considered, the most relevant focus for the
second prong is the symbiotic relationship test.1
3 2
The symbiotic relationship test originated in Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority.'33 In Burton, the Eagle Coffee Shoppe ("Eagle") was sued
by several African American plaintiffs for failing to serve them based on
their race.13  Eagle leased space in a parking garage owned by the city of
Wilmington, Delaware. 13' During the construction of the garage, the city
learned that it would not be able to afford the project unless it entered into
guest policies of the club that it licenses to serve liquor," and therefore there was no rela-
tionship between the state and the private discrimination. Id. (discussing Moose Lodge No.
107 as a "good illustration of how this first prong of the inquiry is applied" despite the fact
that the case predates Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, 500 U.S. 614 (1991), which is gen-
erally credited with establishing the two-pronged approach).
A similar result might occur on the present facts. Potential plaintiffs might advocate
for a broader reading of the term "authority." The plaintiffs would argue that the discrimi-
nation practiced by the grocery stores is aided and abetted by the fact that they are
allowed to participate in and benefit from government programs. Perhaps the court could
be persuaded to view "authority" as stemming from the mere relationship with a govern-
mental entity.
Nevertheless, if the result in and subsequent interpretation of the Moose Lodge No.
107 decision is any indication, plaintiffs will be unlikely to prevail on this point. In Moose
Lodge No. 107, the Court found that while the state did provide liquor licenses, and that
the liquor license benefitted the private discriminating party, the government did not assist
the private entity in its discrimination. 407 U.S. at 175-76. Similarly, in the grocery store
context, while the states and the grocery stores have a relationship, there is no state or
federal law requiring poorer service in the affected neighborhoods.Thus, it will be difficult
to prove that the lack of quality and variety in the stores exists due to some state fiat. If
this is the touchstone, as it appears to be, plaintiffs will certainly encounter difficulty on
this prong.
132. The public function test applies where a private entity "perform[s] a function
that has been 'traditionally exclusively reserved to the State."' Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 309
(Thomas, J., dissenting)(internal citation omitted). In Brentwood, the Court's most recent
state action case, the dissent noted that "[t]he organization of interscholastic sports is nei-
ther a traditional nor an exclusive public function of the States." Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Here, similar to Brentwood, the government has not established a tradition of
selling food to the public. Therefore, grocery stores would not become state actors under
this test.
The government coercion test applies when the state "has exercised coercive power
or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice
must in law be deemed to be that of the State." Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004
(1982). In Blum, the Court considered state funding and state regulation as indicators of
this encouragement. Id. at 1007-1011; see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830,
840-41 (1982) (explaining the approach used in the Blum decision). Retail stores may be
subject to government regulation in some instances. However, in both Blum and Rendell-
Baker, the Court was reluctant to find that even extensive regulations and significant fund-
ing met these goals. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1007-1011; Rendell-Baker, 457 US. at 840-41.
133. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
134. Id. at 716.
135. Id.
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long-term leases with private commercial tenants.13 6 Therefore, the city
entered into a lease with Eagle wherein it promised to pay for the re-
maining construction, furnish utilities, and make repairs. 13 ' For its part,
Eagle was given a tax exemption and allowed to occupy the premises."
38
The Court held that there was a high "degree of state participation and
involvement in discriminatory action."'139 Despite this strong language, the
Court cautioned that given the "very 'largeness' of government," there
will be a number of relationships between government and private parties,
and not all of these will result in a finding of state action.
4
0
c. Applying the Test
Grocery stores can make several arguments against a finding of state
action. Even Burton recognized that mere cooperation with the govern-
ment will not make a private entity a state actor. 4 The fact that the stores
must be licensed by the government will also be insufficient. 42 Although
the regulation of stores has been called "extensive," the Court has held
• 143
that even "extensive" regulation may not result in state action.
Nevertheless, there are facts which bring this issue closer to Burton
than any of the other cases that followed. In Blum and Rendell-Baker, pri-
vate entities were undertaking tasks--such as caring for the sick and
educating children-that benefited the government. However, local gov-
136. Id. at 719.
137. Id. at 720.
138. Id. at 719-720.
139. Id. at 724.
140. Id. at 725-26. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company, 419 U.S. 345 (1974),
the Court reaffirmed this when it stated that paying taxes to the state and regulation by
the state were insufficient to come within the ambit of Burton. See id. at 357-58. More-
over, in Blum, the Court spoke approvingly ofJackson and noted that merely being funded
by the state will not create mutual benefits. See Blum, 457 U.S. 991,1011 ("That programs
undertaken by the State result in substantial funding of the activities of the private entity is
no more persuasive than the fact of r regulation of such an entity in demonstrating that
the State is responsible for decisions made by the entity in the course of its busi-
ness.")(citations omitted). Additionally, Rendell-Baker distinguished Burton by noting that
merely entering into a contract with the state will not convert a private actor into a public
one. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 843 ("Here the school's fiscal relationship with the State
is not different from that of many contractors performing services for the government. No
symbolic relationship such as existed in Burton exists here.").
141. Burton, 365 U.S. at 725-26 ("Owing to the very 'largeness' of government, a
multitude of relationships might appear to some to fall within the Amendment's embrace,
but that, it must be remembered, can be determined only in the framework of the peculiar
facts or circumstances present.").
142. See Moose Lodge No. 107,407 U.S. at 176-77 (refusing to find that State of Penn-
sylvania's decision to license a private club discriminating against African Americans did
not turn it into a state actor).
143. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357-58.
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ernment entities are able to-and frequently do--operate health care fa-
cilities and schools without assistance from the private sector. By contrast,
it is doubtful that the same is true for chain supermarkets. The govern-
ment is not likely to begin providing food directly to the needy. Since the
government cannot operate the program without private involvement,
courts may be more willing to find state action.
Moreover, the scope of the programs is further proof that the gov-
ernment and the chain supermarkets share a special, mutual, relationship.
The Food Stamp and WIC programs are national programs serving mil-
lions of Americans.'4 As in Burton, where the government benefited from
private acts, here, the benefit to the government is that it can operate its
food assistance programs without directly dispersing the food to eligible
participants. In effect, the government has created a private distribution
chain for its commodities programs, and chain grocery stores are the larg-
est link in that chain. Since chain stores account for more than seventy-
five percent of food stamp redemptions, it is clear that if every grocery
chain in America stopped accepting food stamps tomorrow, the program
would surely enter a tailspin as the government's distribution chain would
be irrevocably disrupted. Without the participation of the chain stores, the
programs could not be operated at all, or would operate at a much
higher-and perhaps prohibitive-cost. Therefore, the government bene-
fits from the chain stores' decision to accept food stamps.
The chain stores also benefit. First, federal food assistance recipients
represent a reliable and steady stream of customers for the retailers. 14
Moreover, these customers pay with government vouchers or electronic
funds granted through Electronic Benefits Transfer. 146 These methods en-
sure that the retailer will be paid and protects the retailer against losses
from "bounced" checks or other invalid instruments. Indeed, the EBT
program was devised and marketed as a way to make it easier-and more
profitable-for retailers to participate in the food stamp program. Prior to
this program, they had to redeem paper instruments at a bank.'
47
144. See USDA Food and Nutrition Service, WIC and Retail Grocery Stores Fact Sheet,
http://www.ffis.usda.gov/wic/wicretailstoresfactsheet.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2008) (not-
ing that 8.1 million persons receiveWIC benefits each month);
145. Nationally, there are 23.9 million persons that receive food stamps. USDA Food
and Nutrition Service, Food Stamp FAQ, http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/faqs.htm#1 (last
visited Sept. 20, 2008). Moreover, since the majority of food stamp purchases are made at
chain stores, see Andrews, supra note 127, there is surely a constant stream of people going
to the chain stores.
146. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 2019 (West 2009).
147. Affiliated Computer Services, The Check is Not in the Mail: How ACS EPC Solu-
tions Save Government Agencies Money-and Still Get Benefits to Program Recipients Faster (2008),
available at http://www.acs-inc.com/WorkArea/1inkit.aspx?Linkldentifier=id&IternID=1531
(last visited Aug. 14, 2008) (noting that former paper system was very inconvenient for retail-
ers and further noting EBT program is so successful that benefits under Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) should also be distributed in this manner); Ana R. Quifiones &
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In sum, there are mutual benefits here. The stores can rest assured in
the fact that they will have dedicated revenue with a streamlined delivery
of that revenue. More important, the government avoids the cost and ad-
ministrative burden of providing commodities directly to those in need.
The government saves money; the stores receive a loyal base of customers
with reliable payments. Given the benefits on each side, Burton might ap-
ply here.
2. The Discriminatory Intent Dilemma
Part II, supra, demonstrates that it is the pattern or practice of chain
grocery stores to provide a poorer selection and quality of foods in areas
that are heavily African American and Latino. Even so, there is no explicit
policy requiring poorer service in these areas. When a decision is made
that is ostensibly race-neutral, the plaintiff must prove both discriminatory
impact upon the plaintiff and a discriminatory intent on the part of the
defendant. 4 8 In the present case, while the discriminatory effect should be
easily proven,'49 the discriminatory intent requirement is likely to be an
obstacle to any person attempting to sue grocery stores using the Four-
teenth Amendment.
a. The Law on Discriminatory Intent
In defining discriminatory purpose, the Court has stated:
"Discriminatory purpose"... implies more than intent as voli-
tion or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the
decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least in part "because of," not merely "in spite of" its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group.,50
While the fact that a racial group is disproportionately affected by a
regulation standing alone is generally not enough to generate strict scru-
tiny, the court may consider that fact in evaluating intent.' Other factors
to be considered include: the historical background of the decision, "par-
ticularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious
Jean Kinsey, From Paper to Plastic by 2002: Retailers' Perspective on Electronic Benefit Transfer Sys-
tems for Food Stamps (The Retail Food Industry Center, Working Paper 00-06, Aug. 2000)
(noting benefits of EBT program to retailers, including increased sales for retailers and "lower
costs to implementing the food stamp program").
148. See, e.g.,Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,239 (1976).
149. See supra Part II.B.1.
150. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,279 (1979).
151. See Washington, 426 U.S. at 241.
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purposes,"15 2 departures from normal procedures;" 3 and the legislative or
administrative history.
5 4
b. Application of the law
Proving that grocery stores intentionally provide poorer service in
predominately African American and Latino areas "because of" the race of
the persons living in those areas will be difficult. First, the reasons for the
disparity should be examined. Several ostensibly race neutral reasons have
been proffered. One potential explanation is the possibility that stores in
the different neighborhoods are managed in different styles with different
standards."' Of course, if the store is not properly managed, the quality
and selection of the merchandise will be affected. The quality of manage-
ment is ostensibly race neutral, as stores in any neighborhood could be
poorly managed.
Second, it could be argued that the choice to send particular items
to particular stores is not a matter of race, but of business. In studying this
problem, Congress noted that while low-income stores did not have pre-
mium quality meats, this was likely due to "consumer demand patterns."
156
This would also be a non-racial motivation. Of course, stores are first and
foremost businesses, and if they stock items that do not sell, they are not
operating under rational business principles.
Third, in its studies, Congress could not find any evidence of dis-
criminatory intent.When it looked at the issue, it found that none existed.
Congress stated that while "premium" produce might be sent to higher
income areas, general produce is "packed in crates or bags which are not
susceptible to quality sorting by the chain. Furthermore, it is too expen-
sive and uneconomical to repack older produce and ship it to other stores,
so that transfers of old produce are unlikely to occur. '
Taking all of the above together, it is difficult to argue that the stores
have chosen and arranged their merchandise in this manner "because of"
the race of the customers. Nevertheless, there is the strong counterargu-
ment that remarks such as "Hispanics enjoy sugary foods" could show that
the choices are based on race in some manner. However, the rebuttal ar-
gument is that all grocery stores do try to stock the foods that are popular
in a given community. For instance, a store in a neighborhood with a sig-
nificant Jewish population might make more of an effort to stock Kosher
152. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267
(1977).
153. Id. at 265.
154. Id.
155. Topolski, supra note 67, at 117.
156. Food Chain Selling Practices, supra note 54, at 37.
157. Id.
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items. Thus, it is difficult to say that the choice is "because of" race when
there are also cultural eating patterns involved. To the extent that the cul-
tural eating patterns are not based on stereotypes, but are based in fact, the
line between racism and practicality might be too blurred to say that the
stores' actions are based on race.
A second counterargument is that it is difficult to understand how
the same substandard management could be present in several very differ-
ent store chains in very disparate parts of the nation. On some level,
therefore, one could argue that there must be something more to the
story, especially since the persons primarily affected by this disparity are
primarily African American and Latino. However, the stores would likely
have the better of this argument as well. In the absence of any proof of
explicit discrimination, advocates for plaintiffs would need to examine
whether some type of unconscious racial bias was at play.118 However, the
courts have not been diligent about recognizing and penalizing uncon-
scious biases. s9 Moreover, even if the court were to determine that some
form of unconscious bias was at play here, it would most likely determine
that the bias is one against social status rather than race. All poor persons
serviced by an inadequate store in one of these areas-regardless of race-
would fall prey to the mismanagement issues at the local store. Therefore,
proving the intent to discriminate on the basis of race might be an insur-
mountable task.
160
158. See Charles Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317,
329-336 (1987) (explaining the nature of unconscious racial biases)
159. See Eva Paterson et al., The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection in The 21st Century:
Building upon Charles Lawrence's Vision to Mount a Contemporary Challenge to the Intent Doc-
trine, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (2008)("[W]e have yet to see the courts acknowledge
evidence of unconscious or institutional bias where it matters most: in Equal Protection
Doctrine.").
160. As previously noted, the literature indicates that African Americans, Latinos, and
other minority groups are more likely to live in neighborhoods that do not have adequate
grocery stores. However, as indicated, the grocery store chains could respond to such an
allegation by stating that the motivation is economic, rather than racial. If such an argu-
ment were to be accepted by the courts, rational basis review might be appropriate. When
poor persons are burdened, rational basis review is utilized, as wealth is not a suspect
classification. See Dandrige v.Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). If the chain stores are assumed
to be state actors, rational basis review would be appropriate. See also Anderson v. USAir,
Inc., 619 F Supp. 1191, 1196 (applying rational basis review to private action after assum-
ing state action is present).
The stores would have little difficulty making the argument that they would pass
rational basis review for the lack of choice. They would merely need to assert that there
are legitimate business reasons for their decisions to stock their stores in a particular man-
ner. See id. at 1194-95 (noting that discrimination against the blind in airline exit row
seating was justified by safety concerns). Similarly, grocery stores could argue that quality
items do not sell, and therefore are not stocked. See supra Part II. The courts would be
likely to agree that this is a rational business choice.
With respect to quality, the stores would have slightly more difficulty justifying why
poorer quality merchandise is sold in the stores. However, they could assert that there is no
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c. Summary
For the foregoing reasons, it would be difficult to sue grocery stores
under an equal protection theory. While proving state action might be
possible, there would be considerable difficulties in proving the requisite
discriminatory intent. Therefore, other avenues should be considered.
B. Fundamental Rights Analysis
A fundamental rights claim by potential plaintiffs would also be
likely to fail. It is difficult to identify a fundamental right, as the concept
remains "vague.' '16 ' Nevertheless, the Court has devised a test to evaluate
fundamental rights claims. In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court stated
that fundamental rights are "those fundamental rights and liberties which
are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' and
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed.' '- 61 Moreover, the Court con-
siders whether there has been "a careful description of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest.
' 
163
San Antonio v. Rodriguez is likely to be instructive here.1 64 In San An-
tonio, the court considered whether education is a fundamental right. 
6
1
The plaintiffs were children and parents in low-income Texas school dis-
tricts. 166 At the time of the case, Texas funded its public schools through a
financing scheme that included property taxes. 16 Due to intractable resi-
dential segregation along class lines, schools in high income areas always
had more tax dollars than their counterparts in less affluent areas. The
plaintiffs argued that this arrangement deprived them of the fundamental
right to an education. 69 The court, while recognizing the importance of
intent to treat their impoverished customers differently from anyone else. See, e.g., Thomas
E LaMacchia, Note, Reverse Accommodation of Religion, 81 GEO. L.J. 117, 125 (1992)
(" [T]hrough the use of rational basis review in equal protection cases, the Court acknowl-
edged that the government can intentionally discriminate against certain groups as long as
the classification is rational.") (emphasis added). Again, the Congressional testimony would
support this position.Therefore, the stores would be likely to prevail on this point as well.
161. NowAK& ROTuNDA, supra note 131, at§ 15.7.
162. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325-26 (1937)).
163. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21.
164. See San Antonio indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
165. Id. at 29.
166. See id. at 4-5.
167. See id. at 5, 6-7.
168. See id. at 8.
169. See id. at 29.
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education, held there was no fundamental right to education.' 70 More
important for present purposes, the Court stated,
Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's fi-
nancing system occasioned an absolute denial of educational
opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides no
basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights where
only relative differences in spending levels are involved and
where-as is true in the present case-no charge fairly could be
made that the system fails to provide each child with an op-
portunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the
enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in
the political process."'
Thus, while the Court apparently left the door open to a fundamental
rights challenge on this issue if the state had completely denied an educa-
tion, the Court was reluctant to engage in an analysis that would require
evaluating the relative quality of a particular educational system. In es-
sence, the Court held that even if there were a fundamental right to
education, there would be no fundamental right to the best education
possible-only that education minimally necessary to survive.
The courts are likely to follow this reasoning in the food context.
Just as there is only the right to the most minimal education, it is likely
that courts will find that there is only a right-if any-to the food mini-
mally necessary to survive and subsist. Humans can live and survive-
though perhaps not thrive-on the foods available at the average chain
store. If San Antonio applies, it is unlikely that courts will find that there is
a fundamental right to the best food.
Indeed, the San Antonio court seemed to anticipate this result in its
opinion. In rejecting the fundamental right to an education, the court
noted that if it were to do so, the floodgates might open on other types of
fundamental rights claims. The court stated, "Furthermore, the logical
limitations on appellees' nexus theory are difficult to perceive. How, for
instance, is education to be distinguished from the significant personal
interests in the basics of decent food and shelter?"' 7 2 The Court's language
here strongly suggests that the judges were reluctant to recognize educa-
tion as a fundamental right because it might then be forced to recognize
rights to food and lodging. Although this appears to be dicta, with this
precedent, potential plaintiffs will have difficulty proving that there is a
fundamental right to healthy food.
170. See id. at 35.
171. Id. at 36-37 (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 37.
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C. Civil Rights Statutes
1.Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
In response to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964."' Title II of the Act declared, "All
persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place
of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimina-
tion or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national
origin."'7 4 Where food is concerned, places of public accommodation
were defined as "any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda
fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for con-
sumption on the premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility
located on the premises of any retail establishment; or any gasoline sta-
tion."
175
Title II will provide little assistance to plaintiffs attempting to sue
chain stores. First, the plain meaning of the statute does not include gro-
cery stores of any kind. When speaking of eating establishments, the
statute quite clearly speaks only to establishments "principally engaged in
selling food for consumption on the premises." By contrast, grocery stores
are engaged primarily in the business of selling food that will consumed
off-premises, specifically in the home.7 6 Thus, grocery stores do not ap-
pear to come within the text of the statute.
7 7
Even if the meaning were not clear, the statute could not fairly be
interpreted to include grocery stores. The proper use of accepted cannons
of construction would guard against any other finding. For instance, the
canon "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" means that where a statute
sets forth "a form of conduct, the manner of its performance and opera-
tion, and the persons and things to which it refers are designated, there is
an inference that all omissions should be understood as exclusions.', 8 As
173. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a, et seq (West 2009).
174. Id.§ 2000a(a).
175. Id. § 2000a(b)(1)-(4). The remaining portions of the act concern hotels and
other lodging establishments as well as theaters, stadiums and other places of entertain-
ment. See id. § 2000a(b)(1)-(3).
176. Food Marketing Institute, Facts & Figures: Key Facts, Number of Stores, http://
www.fii.org/facts-figs/?fuseaction=superfact (last visited July 8, 2008).
177. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and
Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. R.Ev. 1283, 1415 (1996) (noting that "Congress knows how
to write a statute that applies to retail stores if it wants to do so" and further "[t]he fact
that it specifically listed a small number of establishments strongly suggests that it did not
intend to regulate the conduct of other businesses").
178. NoRMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:23 (7th ed. 2007).
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applied to Title II, the relevant "things" to which the statute clearly refers
are restaurants, cafeterias, lunchrooms, lunch counters, and soda fountains.
Grocery stores and other retail establishments are not mentioned. Since
they are not mentioned, under the principle of "exclusio unius," the
courts should find that retail establishments were intended to be ex-
cluded.179 Other canons of construction indicate a similar result)80
Second, the legislative history of act is fairly clear. In his exhaustive
analysis of the subject, Professor Joseph William Singer stated:
[T]he legislative history supports the notion that the list [in Title
II] was intended to be exhaustive. The House Report accompa-
nying the bill that eventually became Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 specifically states that the bill "prohibits discrimina-
tion in enumerated public establishments." The Report also
refers to "specified places of public accommodation" and notes
that paragraph (b) "defines certain establishments to be places
of public accommodation." "Enumerated establishments,"
"specified places," and "defining certain establishments" clearly
179. J.W Singer, supra note 177 (reaching the same conclusion through the use of the
expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon).
180. Id. In addition to plain meaning and expressio unius, Professor Singer finds that
three other canons would make it difficult to find that retail stores are within the reach of
Title II. He states:
Third, terms that are defined in a statute have technical meanings that are in-
tended to differ from their ordinary meaning. If a term is specifically defined
in a statute, the court should use the technical, not the ordinary, meaning of
the word. "Each of the following is ... " is a typical way to introduce a defini-
tion section. Fourth, "every word and clause must be given effect." If the list
of covered establishments is not exhaustive, there was no reason to put them
in the statute. The drafters could simply have described businesses that serve
the public and be done with it. Illustration was not necessary, and if it were,
the drafters could have stated that "places of public accommodation include,
but are not limited to .... "The existence of a short list must therefore be in-
tended to exclude places that are not included in the list.
Fifth, "[s]tatutes are to be read in the light of the common law and a statute
affirming a common-law rule is to be construed in accordance with the
common law."The common-law rule understood in 1964 to be the universal
rule was that innkeepers and common carriers (and in some states, places of
entertainment) had duties to serve the public without unjust discrimination,
while other businesses did not. The only purpose of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act was arguably to implement that aspect of the common-law rule while
overturning the pieces of the common-law rule that held that segregation
was a "reasonable regulation" of private property open to the public and that
"separate" facilities were "equal."
Id. at 1415-16. This analysis adds strong support to the points made in the text. Since
grocery stores are a type of retail establishment, if the statute does not cover retail stores,
grocery stores are necessarily excluded for the same reasons.
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suggest an intent to cover only such establishments as are listed
in paragraph (b). Nevertheless, the Additional Majority Views
of Hon. Robert W Kastenmeier criticizes Title II as "deficient
in that it guarantees equal access to only some public accom-
modations, as if racial equality were somehow divisible." He
states:
[T]he bill would allow discrimination to continue in barber
shops, beauty parlors, many other service establishments, retail
stores, bowling alleys, and other places of recreation and par-
ticipation sports, unless such places serve food. It is hard to
follow a morality which allows one bowling alley to remain
segregated, while another bowling alley down the street which
serves sandwiches must allow Negroes to bowl.' 81
As the history notes, the drafters were fully aware that retail stores were
not covered under the proposed statute.
In sum, the plain text, the construction, and the legislative history of
Title 1I all suggest that retail stores are not covered by the statute. Thus, an
amended statute or new statute would be needed to address this problem.
2.TitleVI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act may will prove unhelpful to
potential plaintiffs. Title VI of the Act states, "No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance."1 82 While there are arguments to be made here,183 the plaintiffs
181. Id. at 1416-17 (emphasis added).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
183. Plaintiffs would have several arguments to make in support of applying Title VI
on these facts. They will likely be able to show that the stores receive federal assistance. For
instance, a license is not federal financial support. See, e.g., Gottfried v. FC.C., 655 F2d
297, 312-313 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that while a broadcast license was a valuable com-
modity, it did not constitute "federal financial assistance" for Rehabilitation Act or Title VI
purposes). However, the stores, while they must be granted government approval to accept
Food Stamp or WIC benefits, get more than a mere government license. As stated, they are
paid in the form of government vouchers, coupons, or electronic benefits, which are more
than a license. This direct relationship goes beyond the mere granting of a government
license to engage in an activity.
Plaintiffs would also be able to demonstrate that the stores are recipients of this aid.
While the stores may argue that they are, at best, indirect recipients of federal assistance.
However, the Court's recent cases have held that under certain circumstances, indirect bene-
fits can be covered under the statute. See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 596
(1984) (finding that colleges were recipients of federal aid because, though aid went to stu-
dents first, the students were merely "conduits" for the funds that were intended for the
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will likely fail as they will not be able to prove the required mental state
for the statute. The Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs may assert a
private right of action under Title VI.184 However, where the action is ini-
tiated under Title VI directly, as opposed to one of the regulations
promulgated under Title VI, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
acted with discriminatory intent. 85 Title VI employs the same discrimina-
tory intent standard as equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment.'8 6 For the reasons stated in the previous subsection, the• 87
plaintiffs cannot demonstrate discriminatory intent. Therefore, any claim
under TitleVI will fail.
3. Sections 1981, 1982, and 1983
Section 1981 states that all persons "shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens
... ,,188 Section 1982 states, "All citizens of the United States shall have
the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property."1 89
a. Section 1981
A section 1981 claim will not prevail because section 1981 requires
a demonstration of discriminatory intent.9 The requirements for dis-
criminatory intent under section 1981 are similar to those under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 9' As explained in the prior section, plaintiffs
colleges). Here, the Food Stamp and WIC recipients are conducting the aid to the stores,
which are the ultimate beneficiaries, as they must be compensated for the goods they sell.
Thus, the plaintiffi may prevail on this argument.
184. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001).
185. Id. at 280-81. See also Lewis and Norman, supra, 5 4.9 ("[P]roof of a violation of
the statute itself, as opposed to its implementing regulations, requires evidence in some
form of discriminatory intent.") (citing Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S.
582 (1983)).
186. 9 WEST'S FED. ADMIN. PR c. § 11841 (3d ed. 2001)("Courts have held that Title
VI adopts or follows the Fourteenth Amendment's standard of proof for intentional dis-
crimination.").
187. See supra Part II.A.2.
188. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981(a) (West 2009).
189. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1982 (West 2009).
190. See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Assoc., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 382-83
(1982). See also RODNEY SMOLLA, FED. CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS, § 13.10 (3d ed. 2008).
191. See id.
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would fail to demonstrate the required discriminatory intent.19 2 Thus, the
claim under section 1981 will fail.
193
b. Section 1982
A potential section 1982 suit would probably fail as well, for the
same reason as the 1981 claim.19 4 However, there are independent reasons
why there may be problems with a section 1982 claim.
192. See supra Part I.A.1.a.
193. There is at least one additional reason why the plaintiffs will not prevail. Section
1981 applies only to contracts.The section has been interpreted to cover both existing and
proposed contracts. Plaintiffs could certainly argue that shopping in a grocery store pre-
sents at least a proposed contract. Indeed, at least one scholar has noted: "By stocking the
shelves, a store makes an offer, or a promise, to sell. By picking up the item, the customer
accepts, and makes a return promise to pay. The contract is made at that point, and the sale,
a separate transaction, is completed at the checkout counter." Charlotte H. Sanders, Come
Down and Make Bargains in Good Faith: The Application of 42 US. C. 5 1981 to Race and
National Origin Discrimination in Retail Stores, 4 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 281, 310
(2007).
While plaintiffs have a strong argument on the contract issue, their ability to suc-
ceed is anything but certain. The biggest potential problem is that in most of the cases, the
plaintiffs were complaining about service received at a particular store in a chain. They
were not, however, complaining that the treatment at one store did not comport with the
treatment or service at another store in the same chain, as suggested by the thesis of the
present article. It is possible for the plaintiffs to make this argument, but since this type of
claim has been rarely-if ever-brought under section 1981, it is uncertain that the plain-
tiff; would prevail. With such little guidance, a court could hold for the plaintiffs just as
easily as it could hold for the grocery stores.
194. As noted, claims under section 1981 and 1982 are construed in a similar manner.
Most important for present purposes, both section 1981 and 1982 have been interpreted
to require discriminatory intent. See, e.g., SMOLLA, supra note 190, § 13.24 (noting that
since the decision in General Building Contractors, "most lower courts have read General
Building Contractors as authority for the proposition that § 1982 claims also require proof
of discriminatory intent")(citing Hanson v.Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381, 1386 (5th Cir.
1986); Hamilton v. Svatik, 779 F2d 383, 387 (7th Cir. 1985)). However, some writers have
opined that the question of whether actions under section 1982 require discriminatory
intent has not been completely resolved. See, e.g., Terenia U. Guill, Environmental Justice
Suits Under the Fair Housing Act, 12 TUL. ENVTL. LJ. 189, 217 (1998) ("Courts have split on
which [intent] test is the appropriate one to prove a violation of section 1982.");Valerie P.
Mahoney, Note, Environmental Justice: From Partial Victories to Complete Solutions, 21 C,9a-
DOZO L. REV. 361, 392 n. 221 (1991) ("Unfortunately, to prevail in a suit employing
section 1982, plaintiff; probably must satisfy the onerous discriminatory intent stan-
dard.")(emphasis added) (citations omitted); Brian S. Prestes, Comment, Application of the
Equal Credit Protection Act to Housing Leases, 67 U. Ci. L. REV. 865, 871 n. 47 (2000)
("Whether discriminatory intent ... is an element of a prima facie Section 1982 claim
remains unclear.") (citations omitted). If the requirement of discriminatory intent does
apply to section 1982 claims, our grocery store plaintiffs will fail for the reasons previously
described for section 1981. However, because the question is unclear, the remaining ele-
ments of the section 1982 claim will be discussed.
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The plaintiffs will have difficulty with the "personal property" issue.
"Applied in the context of a purchase of personal property, the elements
would appear to be: 1) plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; 2) he
sought to purchase personal property; 3) he was unable to purchase the
property; and 4) the property remained available for sale to others." '9 The
"right to purchase ... personal property" has been interpreted in a narrow
fashion. In Leach v. Heyman's, the court concluded the plaintiff could not
prevail under § 1982 because he was able to purchase the items that he
had selected. 96 "Nothing that he wanted to buy was withheld from him,
or only made available to him on terms and conditions that differed from
the terms and conditions pursuant to which it was available to others.'
97
Applied to the present issue, the result will likely be the same. The
plaintiffs in this situation, even if they are confronted with a worse grade
of food, are not prevented from making purchases. Thus, the chances of
prevailing on this claim are weak.
c. Section 1983
The plaintiffs will also have difficulty prevailing under section 1983.
Section 1983 provides for liability for any person who "under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... sub-
jects ... any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws...
198 The most relevant portions of the statute are the "color of law" re-
quirement and the "rights, privileges, and immunities."
The "color of law" requirement should be easily met by the plain-
tiffs. The Supreme Court has said that the "color of law" requirement is
"identical" to the "state action" requirement of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 9 In the prior section, this Article outlined why grocery chains
might be considered state actors. Under current law, if the stores are
195. Leach v. Heyman, 233 E Supp.2d 906,911 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (West 2009).
199. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. at 929 ("Similarly, it is clear that in a § 1983 action
brought against a state official, the statutory requirement of action "under color of state
law" and the "state action" requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment are identical."). See
also MARY MASSARON ROss & EDWIN P. VOSS, JR., SWORD AND SHIELD: A PRACTICAL AP-
PROACH TO SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 23 (3d ed. 2006) ("The Supreme Court and the
lower courts have generally treated color of state law and state action as meaning the same
thing.").
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cloaked with state authority, this would bring them within the scope of
section 1983. 200 Thus, the plaintiffs could prevail on this point.
However, the "rights, privileges, and immunities" portion of the
claim will be more difficult. It is well established that plaintiffs may assert
Fourteenth Amendment rights under section 1983.201 However, the Four-
teenth Amendment claim was addressed earlier in this Article. As stated
there, the Fourteenth Amendment claim would fail for lack of discrirmna-
tory intent. 22 Therefore, this is not an adequate ground to support the
section 1983 claim.
A second avenue might be to find a federal law that would require
grocery stores to refrain from discriminating among stores in its chains.
Unfortunately, there is no statute that accomplishes this goal. However,
the federal Food Stamp Act does have a provision stating that "in the cer-
tification of applicant households for the food stamp program, there shall
be no discrimination by reason of race, sex, religious creed, national ori-
gin, or political beliefs" ' 20 3 The Court has stated that plaintiffs can use the
Food Stamp Act to file a section 1983 claim. 20 4 While the statute clearly
prohibits "discrimination" it references discrimination in "the certification
of households" for benefits eligibility. It says nothing about discrimination
in the quality or variety of foods that are available. Additionally, the plain
meaning of the statute does not admit to any alternate interpretation.
Therefore, plaintiffs are unable to seek relief through this vein.
Moreover, even if section 1983 were available on these facts, it
would only help those who are actually food stamp program beneficiaries.
While many of the persons affected by chain store discrimination may be
food stamp beneficiaries, not all of them will be. Many of the "working
poor" do not qualify for or apply for governmental nutrition assistance.
20 5
200. See, e.g., Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Systems, Inc., 195 F3d 584 (10th
Cir. 1999) (finding state action for § 1983 purposes where the defendant helped the state
operate a drug treatment program).
201. Ross & Voss, supra note 199, at 15 (rights that may be enforced under section
1983 include "the Fourteenth Amendment rights to substantive and procedural due proc-
ess and to the equal protection of the laws").
202. See supra Part l.A.l.a. See also Mark M. Hager, Harassment and Constitutional
Tort: The Other Jurisprudence, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 279, 307 (1999) ("A case of
unconstitutional discrimination under § 1983 requires proof of discriminatory intent.")
203. 7 U.S.C. § 2020 (c) (West,Westlaw through P.L. 110-260).
204. See 17 FED. PROC. L. ED. § 42:1025 ("Food stamp claimants may bring a civil
rights action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 against state officials for violations of the Food
Stamp Act.")(citing Victorian v. Miller, 813 E2d 718 (5th Cir. 1987)). See also Haskins v.
Stanton, 794 F2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1986)(finding private right of action under Food Stamp
Act); Gonzalez v. Pingree, 821 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1987) (same). But see Able Sales Co.,
Inc. v. Mead Johnson Puerto Rico, Inc., 420 F Supp.2d 1 (D.P.R. 2006) (declining to find
private right of action under WIC act); Banco de Ponce v. Hinsdale Supermarket Corp.,
663 E Supp. 813 (1987) (same).
205. See Randy Albelda and Heather Boushey, Bridging the Gaps: A Picture of How
Work Supports Work in Ten States 20-21, available at http://www.bridgingthegaps.org/
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However, the bulk of "working poor" tend to live in neighborhoods that
are likely to have moderate to high levels of poverty.2 Thus, they are
likely to shop at the same places and face the discrimination as their
neighbors. The relief should be made available to the widest population
possible. Thus, on both law and policy, this is an inadequate remedy.2 7
D. Administrative Remedies
Federal regulations may provide some assistance, but ultimately lack
the depth to adequately address the issue of store discrimination. There
are several regulations and administrative proclamations that prohibit dis-
crimination in the administration of the Food Stamp Program. For
instance, regulations governing the Food Stamp Act state:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be otherwise subjected to discrimi-
nation under any program or activity of the applicant or
recipient to which these regulations apply. These regulations
apply, but are not restricted, to unequal treatment in priority,
quality, quantity, methods or charges for service, use, occupancy
or benefit, participation in the service or benefit available, or in
the use, occupancy or benefit of any structure, facility, or im-
208provement.
publications/nationalreport.pdf (last visited April 28, 2009) (noting that in the ten states
surveyed, nearly 66% of the families did not qualify for Food Stamp benefits); see id. at 28
(discussing reasons why persons that do qualify for federal assistance are declined or do not
apply).
206. See Margery Austin Turner and Karina Fortuny, Residential Segregation and
Low-Income Working Families 9, available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
411845_residential-segregation jiwf.pdf (last visited April 24, 2009) (noting that 14% of
the working poor live in high poverty neighborhoods, while another 35% live in low-
poverty neighborhoods).
207. It should be noted that if some state law existed to this effect, a plaintiff in an
individual state challenging chain store discrimination might be able to use that state law
as the basis of a section 1983 claim. However, as outlined in the prior section, this is a
national problem requiring a national solution.While state laws might help plaintiffs resid-
ing in certain states, it will not alleviate this as a national issue. As stated in the text, relief
should be made available to as many people as possible. Limiting relief to those fortunate
to live in a particular state will not accomplish this goal.
208. 7 C.FR. § 15.3 (West 2003)) (emphasis added). See also 7 C.ER. § 246.8 (West
2008) (stating "no person shall, on the grounds of race ... be excluded from participation
in, be denied benefits of, or otherwise subject to discrimination under the [WIC] pro-
gram"); Food and Nutrition Service Ins. No. 113-1 (Nov. 8, 2005) ("The U.S. Department
of Agriculture prohibits discrimination in all its programs and activities on the basis of
race, color, national origin, age, disability, and where applicable, sex, marital status, familial
status, parental status, religion, sexual orientation, genetic information, political beliefs,
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Plaintiffs could benefit from this approach. Assuming that plaintiffs
would file complaints with the Department of Agriculture 2 0 one benefit
is that the regulations apparently do not require proof of discriminatory
intent.2 0 In addition, the USDA has the authority to investigate any ques-
tions of unequal treatment based on race or the other classes it is
empowered to protect. 21'Such an investigation could result in sanctions for
the store if the non-compliance is not rectified.2 2 Relieving the plaintiffs
of the heavy burden of discriminatory intent makes the case easier to
prove, as the evidence clearly demonstrates that people of color are ad-
versely affected by the policies of the chain stores. In addition, the USDA
has the authority to investigate any questions of unequal treatment based
on race or the other classes it is empowered to protect. Such an investi-
gation could result in sanctions for the store if the non-compliance is not
rectified.214
Despite the ability to investigate, the USDA regulations will provide
little in the way of long-term solutions for several reasons. First, the
USDA does not require a store to provide a certain level of quality of
merchandise to become a certified retailer for its programs.2"5 Thus, the
stores have little incentive to take affirmative steps to stock fresh, healthy
foods unless and until there is a complaint.
Second, and perhaps more relevant, the USDA's civil rights charge is
directed at the protection of those that are recipients of the agency's
reprisal, or because all or part of an individual's income is derived from any public assis-
tance program.").
209. The regulations do not appear to create a private cause of action in favor of a
plaintiff. Therefore, it appears the way to force compliance with the regulations is to file a
complaint with the U.S.D.A. See, e.g., Food and Nutrition Service Ins. No. 113-1,Appen-
dix A (Nov. 8, 2005) (outlining complaint procedures and requiring the complaint to be
filed with the "Secretary of Agriculture" within 180 days of the alleged discrimination).
210. See, e.g., id. at 4 (defining discrimination as "[tihe act of distinguishing one per-
son or group of persons from others, either intentionally, by neglect, or by the effect of
actions or lack of actions based on their protected bases") (emphases added).
211. It should be noted that 7 C.ER. § 15.3, the non-discrimination section, is lo-
cated in sub-part A of the regulations, which is entitled "Non-Discrimination in Federally
Assisted Programs of the Department of Agriculture--Effectuation of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The WIC regulations have the same purpose. See 7 C.ER. § 246.8 (a)
(noting that "The State agency shall comply with the requirements of TitleVI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964" in ensuring that no recipients are discriminated against)
212. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281-82 (2001)(requiring proof of dis-
criminatory intent for actions under Title VI itself, but permitting actions under its
implementing regulations).
213. Telephone interview with Anita Cunningham, Branch Chief, Federal Programs
Branch of USDA Food and Nutrition Service Civil Rights Office. Friday, April 24, 2009
(notes on file with author).
214. See id.
215. See id. See also E-mail correspondence with Cora Russell, Acting Chief, Retailer
Management and Issuance Branch Benefit Redemption Division, Tuesday, April 21, 2009
(on file with author).
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services. 21 6 Thus, the agency could only investigate claims by current food
stamp beneficiaries. As previously noted, while many of the persons
affected by chain store discrimination may be food stamp recipients, not
all of them will be.2 my Second, as noted, the USDA can only provide
assistance for those persons falling into a protected category218 While the
forgoing analysis indicates that persons of color will be more likely to fall
victim to the stores' discriminatory practices, a person of any race could
be affected.1 9 Moreover, a sole Caucasian person living in a primarily
African-American or Latino neighborhood would be just as affected by
the horrible practices, though it would be much harder for that person to
claim discrimination on the basis of her race. Thus, the current regulations
are somewhat limited in scope.
1. Summary
In conclusion, while there are many approaches potential plaintiffs
might take to challenge chain store practices, none will provide relief to
the broad range of potential plaintiffs. The largest hurdle is the absence of
discriminatory intent, which forecloses several paths to judicial redress.
Since current law does not provide a clear avenue to relief, a new path
must be created.
III.THE PROPOSED REMEDIES
While current law does not provide a remedy to the problem of
grocery store discrimination, current law does provide the tools to craft a
remedy. The ability of each branch to approach this problem will now be
examined, focusing on the legislative branch. 220
216. See USDA Food and Nutrition Service, Home Page-Mission and Vision,
http://www.fns.usda.gov/cr/ (last visited Friday, April 24, 2009) (noting that the Of-
fice's mission is to protect "FNS customers and employees" from discrimination on a
prohibited basis).
217. See also Part II.C.3.c. supra.
218. See note 208 supra. See also, Food and Nutrition Service Ins. No. 113-1,Appx.E
(Nov. 8, 2005) (Appendix E is a "Sample Complaint Form" listing "Race/Color, National
Origin, Sex, Religion, Age, Disability" as the basis for complaints.
219. See USDA Food and Nutrition Service-FAQ, http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/
faqs.htm#22 (last visited Friday, April 24, 2009).
220. The legislative branch is the proper focus for several reasons.While the president
would not be able to act directly due to a lack of Congressional or statutory authorization
on this point, see, e.g., Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952),
agencies, which also fall under the umbrella of the Executive Branch, see, e.g, NowAK &
ROTuNDA, supra note 131, § 4.8(b), may be able to assist. Agencies have the power to adopt
rules that have the force of law. See id. (noting same). This power is unlikely to be helpful
in this context. In order for an agency to make binding rules, a specific statute must give
the agency the authority to do so. See, e.g., WILLIAM Fu K & RICHARD SEAMON, ADMINIS-
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A. Congress'Authority under the Commerce Clause
Congress is granted many powers under the constitution. The
Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce the
, 221
provisions of the amendment through "appropriate legislation.
Additionally, Congress has the power to tax and spend. Finally, the
Commerce Clause states that Congress can regulate "commerce ...
among the several states.' ' 222 Using Congress' spending power23 or
TnATIW LAW 137 (2d ed. 2006) (stating same). In this instance, there is no current law that
the agencies could use as a platform from which to launch new rulemaking. While the
Department of Agriculture is the most likely candidate for the task of overseeing grocery
store policies, the agency does not have general rulemaking authority, and there is no stat-
ute that would grant it the authority to pass rules in this context.
Finally, while the agencies must have statutory authorization to pass legislative rules,
they may pass interpretive rules without such authorization. See id. However, this power is
unlikely to be helpful here. The agency would have to interpret current laws. Even if it
changed its interpretation of what "discrimination" means under the Food and Nutrition
Service guidelines, this new interpretation would not be of much use, as the only persons
that would be able to benefit from the interpretation would be those who are participants
in federal food programs. As previously stated, to reach as many people as possible, the law
should not be tied to the operation of any particular program. See supra note 207. Con-
gress has the ability to reach more of the American public, so it is the appropriate actor
here.
221. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
222. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, Cl. 1,3.
223. The power to spend is two-fold.JohnV.Jacobi, Federal Power, Segregation, and Mental
Disability, 39 Hous. L. Rev. 1231, 1272 (2003) (distinguishing Congress' "direct" spending
power from its "conditional" spending power).The power can be used to impose conditions
on states to encourage them to comply with federal mandates, or the government can spend
the money directly for its programs. See id. When Congress attempts to use its authority to
encourage compliance with conditions, the spending must be for the general welfare, the
condition must be unambiguously stated, and Congress may not impose an unconstitutional
condition. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987).
Turning to the current issue, the states receive money from the federal government
to operate their food stamp programs. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(a) (2005) ("The State agency of
each participating State shall assume responsibility for the certification of applicant house-
holds and for the issuance of coupons and the control and accountability thereof."). Thus,
one method of addressing the disparity in services provided by chain stores would be to
require the States to require non-discrimination by retail stores as a condition of receiving
federal funds under the Food Stamp program. However, the States currently do not certify
the retail stores for participation in the federal programs. Rather, the stores are certified by
the federal government. See 7 U.S.C.A. 5 2018(a)(1) (West 2009)("No retail food store ...
shall be approved to be authorized or reauthorized for participation in the food stamp
program unless an authorized employee of the Department of Agriculture, a designee of
the Secretary, or if practicable, an official of the State or local government designated by
the Secretary, has visited the store or concern for the purpose of determining whether the
store or concern should be approved or reauthorized."). This is not an issue under the
commerce clause, as private citizens engaging in practices affecting interstate commerce
can be regulated. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (allowing
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Fourteenth Amendment powers may be difficult on these facts.
Therefore, this section will focus on describing how Congress can use its
power under the Commerce Clause to remedy the stated problem.
Congress to regulate single farmer engaged in private industry where his practices in the
aggregate affected interstate commerce).
Congress can also use its spending powers to affect the decisions of private actors
with which it does business. Rust v. Sullivan, 461 U.S. 173, 197-200 (1991) (affirming
Congress' authority to attach conditions to grants given to private and public health ser-
vice providers). In this instance, the federal government has already required that any
retailer wishing to participate in a federal program must sign an assurance of non-
discrimination. See, e.g., Food and Nutrition Service Instruction No. 113 (requiring such).
Thus, any activity in this regard under the spending clause is likely to be redundant to the
laws that are currently in place.
Moreover, even if current laws were amended or an entirely new law was to be
written to address the foregoing issues, for policy reasons, the spending clause is not the
wisest choice to address the problem of chain store discrimination. The spending clause
applies only where the federal government has spent money. Therefore, any law under the
spending clause would not reach stores that currently do not agree to accept food stamps.
While it may be assumed that a majority of stores do participate in these programs, see,
e.g., United States v. Harrington, 108 F3d 1460, 1473 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Sentelle,J., dissent-
ing) (rejecting application of interstate commerce clause to robbery by stating, "There is
no corner grocery in Kansas that does not stock orange juice from Florida or California;
none in Florida or California that does not stock salt from some other state."), the com-
merce clause would reach any stores involved in interstate commerce regardless of their
relationship to any government programs. Thus, the commerce clause has the potential to
have a broader impact.
224. Congress' enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment are likely to
be of little assistance here. While earlier Court decisions interpreted Congress' powers
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment broadly, see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641, 651 (1966)("Correctly viewed, 5 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing
Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed
to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."), the Supreme Court later se-
verely limited Congress' authority under Section 5, noting that any congressional action
under this section must be "proportional" and "congruent" to the problem at issue. City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-34 (1997). First, the scope of Congress' powers under
this section is currently in flux and quite difficult to define with precision. See, e.g., Samuel
Estricher & Margaret H. Lemos, 2000 Sup. CT. REV. 109, 110 (2001) ("The Court's recent
Section 5 jurisprudence has met with both confusion and consternation in the legal acad-
emy."); Calvin Massey, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 ("Few questions of constitutional law are
as uncertain as the scope of Congressional power to enforce the substantive provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment."). Second, Congress' power under section five does not reach
private activity. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 623-624 (2000)(discussing
and holding that state action is required).While there is an argument to be made on state
action, see supra Part II.A.1., it is far from certain that the courts will accept this argument.
Finally, section five can only address the deprivation of constitutional rights. See Flores, 521
U.S. at 518-19 (reiterating that Congress can only act to remedy "constitutional viola-
tions"). However, here, it would be difficult to ascertain exactly what constitutional right is
at issue. Arguably, it is the Fourteenth Amendment, but as previously explained, the Four-
teenth Amendment will not apply on these facts. See supra Part II. In sum, given the
uncertainty of the requirements and the hurdle of state action, a law under section five is
unlikely to be helpful in addressing chain store discrimination. The benefit of legislating
under the commerce clause is that no state is required. As long as the chain grocery stores
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1. Current Commerce Clause Law
The Supreme Court initially interpreted the Commerce Clause in
an expansive manner, permitting Congress to regulate a wide range of
'25
activities as commerce. However, the court later adopted a more restric-
tive interpretation that limited commerce to the actual transport of
goods.226 This narrow interpretation persisted until the "court packing
controversy" of 1937, after which the court adopted a much broader in-
.• • 227
terpretation that allowed Congress to regulate a wide range of activities.
The Court's broad interpretation persisted until the Court's 1995
decision in Lopez. That case-along with the later cases of Morrison and
Gonzales v. Raich-represented a shift toward a more narrow Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. The Lopez counterrevolution narrowed the Clause
in several ways. First, Congress can regulate the channels and instrumen-
talities of interstate commerce, things "in interstate commerce," and "those
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce." 22 Second,
Congress can regulate intrastate activity that, when aggregated, has a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce.22 Third, Congress' authority to
regulate intrastate activity under the "substantial effect" prong is strongest
are engaged in interstate commerce, which nearly all of them are, the stores would be
subject to regulation under the commerce clause.
225. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190-94 (1824) (giving the
word "commerce" a broad construction).
226. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) ("Commerce
succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it."); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238,
298 (1936) (limiting commerce to the "transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of
commodities between the citizens of the different states" and excluding manufacture).
227. Gregory WWatts, Note, Gonzales v. Raich: How to Fix a Mess of "Economic" Pro-
portions, 40 AKRON L. REV. 545, 585 (2007) ("While President Roosevelt threatened a
court-packing plan to save the New Deal legislation from judicial invalidation by loading
the Court with justices willing to find his policies constitutional, the then-existing Court
abandoned the restrictive interpretations in the Commerce Clause in favor of an almost
plenary power interpretation."). See also N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 36-37 (1937)(rejecting previous interpretation limiting commerce clause to "trans-
actions which can be deemed to be an essential part of a 'flow' of interstate or foreign
commerce").
228. It is important to note that there is a difference between things "in commerce"
and things "affecting commerce." It has been argued that the two are quite similar. While
similar, the two remain distinct even in the post-Lopez era. The Lopez court mentioned
them separately. Moreover, in Reno v. Condon, the Court upheld a statute based on Con-
gress' ability to regulate "things" in commerce. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148
(2000)("[T]he personal, identifying information that the DPPA regulates is a "thin[g] in
interstate commerce," and that the sale or release of that information in interstate com-
merce is therefore a proper subject of congressional regulation.")(emphasis added). In light
of the differences, these items will be separately discussed.
229. United States v. Lopez,514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). See also Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1, 11-13 (2005) (referencing and relying heavily on the Court's previous decision
in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
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when the activity itself is economic in nature.230 Fourth, the term "eco-
nomic" should be granted a more defined, less broad meaning as "the
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.!2 3' Finally, to
ensure success upon judicial review, Congress should make factual find-
ings, but the Court will not blindly defer to those findings if the activity is
only tangentially related an economic activity.23 2 These concepts will now
be applied to the issue at hand.
2. Application of the Commerce Clause
In order to apply the Commerce Clause here, we must decide if
food fits within one of the categories identified in Lopez. Lopez reaf-
firmed that Congress can regulate the channels and instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, things "in interstate commerce", and "those ac-
tivities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce." It should
be easy to conclude that food is neither a channel nor an instrumental-
ity of commerce.233 Nevertheless, food is either a "thing in commerce"
or an item "substantially affecting commerce."
Food is clearly a thing "in commerce." Americans enjoy a variety
of products in their grocery stores -Florida oranges,3 Washington ap-
ples, 23  Michigan cherries, 236 Vermont syrup23 7 -that have arrived from
230. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (stating "While we need not
adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order
to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce
Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.").
231. Raich, 545 U.S. at 25-26.
232. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602,610-14 (explaining the decision to reject Congressional
findings regarding the extent of the effect of domestic violence on the economy as being
too attenuated from the stream of interstate commerce).
233. DAN T. COENEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 32-33 n. 2
(2004) (noting that channels of commerce are the "corridors of movement and trade"
such as highways and rail lines, while the instrumentalities of commerce are the "vehicles
and other tools used in exploiting those corridors (planes, trains, ships, etc.)").
234. See Hector Florin, The Sorry State of Florida Citrns, TIME, Aug. 28, 2008, available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1836766,00.html (last visited Sept. 8,
2008) (noting that Florida is "by far the largest ... orange-producing state in the country").
235. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 336
(1977) ("Washington State is the Nation's largest producer of apples."). See also USDA
Foreign Agriculture Service, The World Apple Situation (Feb. 20, 2002), http://
www.fas.usda.gov/htp2/circular/2000/00-03/apple.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2008) (noting
that Washington State was largest apple producing state in America).
236. Webpage of U.S. Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich), http://levin.senate.gov/issues/
index.ctm?mainissue-agriculture (last visited Sept. 8, 2008) (noting that Michigan is the
nation's largest producer of tart cherries).
237. Vermont Maple Sugar Makers' Association & Vermont Maple Foundation
Homepage, http://www.vermontmaple.org/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2008) (noting that Ver-
mont is nation's largest producer of maple syrup).
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another state. The food in each store must travel from one state to an-
other to be sold. Moreover, the amount of food in interstate commerce
is not de minimis-"almost every state in the nation buys 85 to 90 per-
cent of its food from someplace else. 2 3 Thus, the movement of food in
the grocery industry has a clear interstate quality. The Supreme Court
has long recognized that Congress has the authority to regulate food
traveling in interstate commerce.2 39 Moreover, the movement of food in
interstate commerce has been the basis of the application of the com-
merce clause in other settings. 2' ° Thus, the interstate nature of the
grocery stores should provide a sufficient basis for the application of
the Commerce Clause.
This argument may be criticized on several fronts. First, it may be
asserted that while Congress is able to regulate food to ensure mini-
mum health and safety standards,241 requiring the food to be of a higher
standard than that required for edibility would be one step removed
from regulating commerce. This criticism should be easily refuted,
however. In Katzenbach v. McClung,242 the Supreme Court affirmed that
238. GREG PAHL, THE COMPLETE IDIOT'S GUIDE TO SAVING THE ENVIRONMENT 102
(Alpha Books 2001).
239. See, e.g., Hippolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1911) (noting
that Congress had the authority to pass the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 preventing
the interstate shipment of adulterated food articles under its commerce powers).
240. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296-97 (1964) (affirming constitu-
tionality of Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to restaurant where "substantial portion of
the food served in the restaurant had moved in interstate commerce").
241. See, e.g., Hippolite Egg Co., 220 U.S. at 57-58 (noting that the Pure Food and
Drug Act of 1906 preventing the interstate shipment of adulterated food articles under
Commerce Clause); see also United States v. 40 Cases, More or Less, or Six One Gallon
Cans, 289 F2d 343, 346 (2d Cir. 1961)(noting that Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was
constitutional because there was "no doubt of the power of Congress so to protect the
public with respect to foodstuffi which have been shipped in interstate and foreign com-
merce") (citations omitted); Mich. Meat Ass'n v. Block, 514 F Supp. 560, 561-62 (WD.
Mich. 1981) (discussing interstate commerce aspects of the Federal Meat Inspection Act).
242. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). On this same point, critics may urge that any reliance upon
Katzenbach is outdated, as the Court's more recent cases-Lopez, Morrison, and Raich-
represent a new Commerce Clause era. It is true that Lopez and Morrison indicated the
Court's strong reluctance to allow Congressional regulation of non-economic activities.
However, Katzenbach should remain good law today. To the extent that Congress is trying
to regulate an ostensibly non-economic activity (discrimination) that has a substantial
impact on interstate commerce (a discriminating restaurant that uses interstate commerce
to aid its discrimination or a grocery store that carries many products moving in interstate
commerce), it would seem that Katzenbach would fall in line with the teachings of the
newer cases. Indeed, in the post-Lopez era, writers are still urging the use of the Com-
merce Clause to regulate businesses with substantial items moving in interstate commerce.
See, e.g., Samuel J. Winokur, Note, Seeing Through the Smoke: The Need for National Legisla-
tion Banning Smoking in Bars and Restaurants, 75 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 662, 689 n.234 (2007)
(suggesting that Congress use its Commerce Clause powers to ban smoking in public food
establishments "based on the fact that bars and restaurants affect interstate commerce by
obtaining their supplies and food from out of state").
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964, enacted under Congress' Commerce
Clause authority, 3 could reach a restaurant that received a substantial
portion of its food after it had travelled in interstate commerce.244 If the
Commerce Clause can be used to require a business that is involved in
interstate commerce to serve certain persons, it would also seem that
the Clause would be available to require that all persons receive the
same level of service. 45
Second, critics may urge that even if the quality of the food could
be regulated under the Commerce Clause, requiring the stores to ex-
pand their selection and carry more healthful items would not meet the
standard. The critics would argue that the fact that people are unable to
purchase healthful foods in their own neighborhoods is a local issue.
Although the items may have travelled in interstate commerce, the fail-
ure to carry them is more removed from interstate commerce than
whether the food is of a certain quality.
This argument can be refuted whether it is made with respect to
the quality or selection argument. 46 As previously stated, the food in
the chain stores is of a lower quality in the inner city as compared to
the suburbs. There is also a lack of healthy items offered for sale. These
disparities are a factor in generating obesity in the affected neighbor-
hoods.4 7 Even if the food itself is not the direct object of regulation,
because its absence is a leading factor in turning the affected neighbor-
hoods into obesogenic environments, the commerce clause should
apply.
Obesity clearly has an impact on interstate commerce. Obesity
can cause or worsen several medical conditions, such as hypertension,
Type 2 diabetes, coronary heart disease, stroke, gallbladder disease, os-
243. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 245 (1964) (explain-
ing that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted using Congress' power to "regulate
interstate commerce").
244. See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 296-97 (finding that the fact that the Ollie's Barbe-
que restaurant received 45% of its meat from interstate commerce clause was sufficient to
apply the commerce clause even though the restaurant was not located near an interstate
and did not advertise to interstate travelers).
245. See, e.g., Eddy v. Waffle House, Inc., 335 F Supp.2d 693, 701-02 (D.S.C. 2004)
(applying public accommodations portions of Civil Rights Act, which was passed under
Congress' Commerce Clause authority, to claim of racialized denial of service and refusing
to deny claim as to all plaintiffi); Bobbitt v. Rage, Inc., 19 F Supp.2d 512, 522 (WD.N.C.
1998) (refusing to dismiss Title II public accommodations claim based on racial discrimi-
nation in service because "[b]eing singled out by the management of a restaurant and, on
the basis of race, made to prepay for one's dinner when the normal practice is to pay after
the meal, violates that customer's right to 'the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, ser-
vices, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations' of that establishment").
246. On the quality argument, critics may assert that a lack of quality has no impact
on interstate commerce because even if the food travels in interstate commerce, shoppers
buy food at their local stores and eat it at their homes in their local neighborhoods.
247. See supra Part I.A.
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teoarthritis, sleep apnea, and endometrial, breast, and colon cancers.
Obesity is increasingly being treated as a disease in and of itself:9 Esti-
mates indicate that caring for an obese employee can cost a company
$6,000 annually-more than $1,500 above the average cost per em-
ployee..2 s0 The most drastic option for treating obesity-gastric bypass
surgery-can cost nearly $30,000.2 Indeed, annual hospital costs re-
lated to obesity for children alone were $127 million in the period
from 1997-1999, as compared to $35 million in the period from 1979-
1981.252 For the total population, obesity created $61 billion in direct
medical expenses in 2000.253 Some pay the ultimate price, as obesity is
responsible for 280,000 to 300,000 U.S. deaths per year.2 4 Thus, obesity
is clearly an economic issue.
Not only is obesity an economic issue, it also has an affect on in-
terstate commerce. As noted above, it affects the amounts that
employers must pay for health care for their employees, creating a stag-
gering health care bill. Health care is an interstate industry. In another
context, Congress has stated that "Congress finds that the health care
and insurance industries are industries affecting interstate commerce.
' 2
5
s
Indeed, it has been stated:
Lopez and Morrison require that activity be economic in na-
ture and bear a substantial relationship to interstate
commerce to fall within congressional power to regulate
under the Commerce Clause ... American hospitals and
248. See supra note 10.
249. See CTR. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF HEALTH, MAKING A HEALTHY LIFE AVAILABLE
TO ALL 4 (2005), available at http://www.cfah.org/news/obesity briefing/ (last visited
Sept. 26, 2008).
250. See id. at 4-5.
251. See id. at 4.
252. See U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Preventing Obesity and Chronic
Diseases Through Good Nutrition and Physical Activity, http://www.healthierus.gov/
steps/summit/prevportfolio/PA-HHS.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2008).
253. See id.
254. See Morland, supra note 38, at 333.
255. Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act, H.R. 5,
108th Cong. S 2 (a)(2) (2003), cited in Nim Razook, A National Medical Malpractice Reform
Act (And Why The Supreme Court May Prefer to Avoid It) 28 SErON HALL LEGIS.J. 99, 122
n.151 (2003). See also Martin Redish, Doing It with Mirrors: New York v. United States and
Constitutional Limitations on Federal Power to Require State Legislation, 21 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 593, 609 (1994) ("[1]t is likely that ... Congress could demonstrate that health care,
for the most part, is an industry involved in interstate commerce, and that it would be
impracticable to require Congress to separate out whatever portion of the industry is actu-
ally intrastate."); Ellwood F Oakley, III, The Next Generation of Medical Malpractice Dispute
Resolution:Alternatives to Litigation, 21 GA. ST. L. REV. 993, 996 (2005) ("Courts have held
that state laws affecting arbitration agreements within the health care industry are subject
to federal preemption because health care affects interstate commerce.").
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other providers of health care services are overwhelmingly
private entities providing services in return for payment.
Such businesses affect interstate commerce every bit as much
as do businesses engaged in intrastate coal mining, intrastate
credit transactions, restaurants utilizing substantial interstate
supplies, inns and hotels catering to interstate guests, and
production and consumption of homegrown wheat.5 6
In light of these linkages, obesity is sure to be found to have a "substan-
tial effect" on interstate commerce.
The counterargument here is that regulating obesity would run
afoul of the teachings of Lopez, Morrison, and Raich. However, those
cases would assist, rather than hinder the proffered interpretation. Lopez
and Morrison stand for the proposition that Congress' authority to regu-
late non-economic activity is limited. However, unlike the Gun Free
School Zones Act or the Violence Against Women Act, which at-
tempted to regulate activity that was non-economic in nature, here,
Congress would be regulating an activity-the sale and consumption of
food-that clearly has an impact on the economy.
Lopez and Morrison also teach that the connection between com-
merce and the regulated activity must be direct. It could be argued that
the link between obesity and its impact on the economy is attenuated
because there are intermediate steps-not to mention a time lapse-
between the time a person shops at a store, the time a person becomes
obese, and the time when that obesity will produce an effect on the
economy. This indirect linkage might support an argument that the
proposed link here is more akin to that in Morrison, where the Court
said that even if there were economic effects of domestic violence, the
impact on interstate commerce was too attenuated.
However, there is an important factor which would set this sce-
nario apart from Morrison. In Morrison, the activity that Congress sought
to regulate was itself non-economic in nature as there is no economic
component to violent behavior against women. By contrast, not only
does obesity have an effect on the economy through its devastating im-
pact on the health care industry, it is the direct byproduct of an
economic activity-namely, the purchase of food. While the impact on
the economy may be delayed for an individual person, it is ever-present
because in the nation at any given time, there will be a number of
obese people, and a number of those people will have complications
and co-morbidities that impact the national economy.
Finally, even if it were decided that the sale of food, the resulting
obesity, and the impact on health care were all non-economic, all is not
lost. The Court has stated that while "thus far in our Nation's history
256. John V. Jacobi, Federal Power, Segregation, and Mental Disability, 39 Hous. L. REV.
1231, 1266-67 (2003) (citing to Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60).
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our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activ-
ity only where that activity is economic in nature," it would not "adopt
a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic
activity.,,157 If ever a non-economic problem called for Congressional
attention it is obesity. Obesity and its impacts are devastating on a
physical and emotional level for the affected individuals and, when ag-
gregated, it also impacts our entire nation. If the Court disagrees, it
should consider applying this as an alternate approach.
3. Summary
The foregoing paragraphs indicate that discrimination in the qual-
ity and selection of food in grocery stores impacts the national
economy directly. As a result, Congress should be able to regulate this
matter using its Commerce Clause powers, and if challenged, the
Courts should be inclined to uphold the exercise of this power.
B. The Proposed Law
Having outlined Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause,
the structure of such a law should be examined. It is proposed that
Congress should enact a law with the following provisions:
Sec. 1-All chain grocery stores selling goods received in in-
terstate commerce or otherwise impacting interstate
commerce must sell the same quality of goods in each store
of the chain.
Sec. 2-All chain grocery stores selling goods received in in-
terstate commerce or otherwise impacting interstate
commerce must sell the same selection of goods in each
store of the chain unless there is a bona fide business neces-
sity that would dictate otherwise.
Sec. 3-All stores must post, in an area conspicuous to cus-
tomers, a poster listing the requirements of this statute, and
the contact information for reporting violations of the stat-
ute to the designated agency. Failure to post such a poster
will result in a $500 fine for each occurrence.
Sec. 4-Any person patronizing any store covered under this
act shall be allowed to file a complaint with the Secretary of
the Department of Agriculture asserting that the chain has
not complied with the law.
257. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,613 (2000).
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Sec. 5-Any chain violating Section 1 or Section 2 of this
Act: 1) shall be fined $1000 per violation; and 2) will be re-
quired to correct the violation by order of the Secretary.
Sec. 6-Any store failing to correct a violation after being
ordered to do so must pay a fine of $10,000 for each viola-
tion alleged. Upon the accrual of more than five violations
for one individual store in a chain, the individual store's li-
censure to accept coupons from the Supplemental Security
Income Program for Women, Infants, and Children or the
Food Stamp Program may be revoked. Upon the accrual of
more than 100 violations across the entire chain, no store in
the chain shall be permitted to participate in the Supple-
mental Security Income Program for Women, Infants, and
Children or the Food Stamp Program may be revoked.
Sec. 7-All funds collected under this act shall be used to
fund the enforcement and operation of the Act.
a. Sections One and Two
Sections one and two explain which activities and businesses are
covered by the statute. All chain stores selling goods travelling in inter-
state commerce would be covered under the statute. Section one would
require that these stores provide the same quality of goods at all stores.
Section two would require the same selection, unless there is a bona
fide business necessity.
A bona fide business necessity is a concept borrowed from Title
VII.2ss In Title VII disparate impact cases, an employer can raise a busi-
ness necessity defense.2' 9 While the contours of that defense are far from
clear,2 60 it is clear that the defense does not cover things that are merely
more convenient for a business or that are taken for purely business
purposes. 6 While this defense is not a perfect analog given the differ-
'6'ence in treatment between customers and employees; there should be
some defense for stores that have tried to comply. Thus, the defense
would not apply where it was merely more convenient to stop carrying
258. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e, et seq. (West 2009).
259. See id. § 2000e-2 (k)(1)(A)(i).
260. See James 0. Pearson, What Constitutes "Business Necessity"Justifying Prima Facie
Discriminatory Employment Practices under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 36 A.L.R. FED.
9, § 2(a) (1978) ("The courts are not so well decided ... as to what constitutes a business
necessity.").
261. See id. (noting that the defense does not apply to "business convenience" or
things that are motivated by purely business concerns).
262. See id. (noting that "job-relatedness" is also required, meaning that the business
necessity must be related to the job.) That will not be an issue in the present case.
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an item, but it would apply where the stores can show that they
stopped carrying a certain product for purely business reasons. More-
over, the defense would not apply to a refusal to carry a product based
on data prior to this act under normal circumstances. Given the move-
ment of disadvantaged customers due to current discrimination, any
current sales data would be inaccurate.
The proposed defense would cover situations where, for instance,
a retailer has carried a particular product for at least six months with
little or no movement of the product. When it comes to store inven-
tory, more flexibility should be granted. It would be unreasonable to
ask a store to carry an item that is not selling. However, it is not unrea-
sonable to ask a store to attempt to carry a product and actually give
the customers an opportunity to purchase the product in their own
neighborhood.
b. Section Three
Sections three would require stores to post notification of the law
in their stores. This notification is critical, as the proposed law would
create a significant change in the rights of consumers. Therefore, they
must be made aware of their new rights. It is surely not onerous to ask
stores to place a poster where the customers can view it.
c. Sections Four, Five, and Six
Sections four, five, and six create a method for the filing and reso-
lution of complaints. Section four would allow the customers to file
complaints with the Department of Agriculture, the agency responsible
for ensuring compliance with the law. The law therefore, by its terms,
would not directly create a private right of action in the courts. Section
five outlines the remedy for such violations. First, the store must pay a
fine. Additionally, the store must correct the violation, presumably by
either stocking the missing items or stocking items of a higher quality.
These requirements are very minor and designed to provide as little
intrusion into the day to day store operations as possible. Finally, section
six would require that recalcitrant stores pay an even higher fine, and
may lose certification to participate in federal benefits programs. This
section is important because providing stiff penalties for non-
compliance will send a strong message to the stores and encourage
them to comply.
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d. Section Seven
Section seven is a unique provision. Fines will be collected from
the program. Hopefully, by using the fines to support the program, the
program will create a built-in stream of income, which will reduce the
number of expenditures.
C. Critiquing the Act
There are many benefits to the proposed act. First, the act directly
relies on the commerce clause, which should help it overcome consti-
tutional challenges.263 Also, by relying on the commerce clause, there is
no need to prove intentional discrimination or state action.264 Under
this act, the activity could be reached regardless of the mental state.
Second, the fact that there is no private right of action in the statute
should ensure that the new legislation will not create a deluge of new
litigation.
Third, unlike current laws concerned with equality in federal pro-
grams, this proposal does not limit the complainants to a particular race
or other protected class. Thus, under the proposed Act, any person of
any race could file a complaint, even if he or she is not a member of
the race "most" affected by the store discrimination. This change is sig-
nificant because discriminatory intent against a particular group-or
even discriminatory effect on such a group-might be difficult to prove
even on seemingly compelling facts. Additionally, the problem of gro-
cery store discrimination, while primarily affecting persons of color,
potentially has a much broader reach. 26' Thus, the law needs a remedy
with a similarly broad scope.
Fourth, in another significant departure from current law, a com-
plainant under the act need not be a recipient of federal benefits. There
are a number of working poor that may be constrained to shop at these
263. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 ("Like the Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in
Lopez, § 13981 contains no jurisdictional element establishing that the federal cause of
action is in pursuance of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. Although Lo-
pez makes clear that such a jurisdictional element would lend support to the argument
that S 13981 is sufficiently tied to interstate commerce, Congress elected to cast 5 13981's
remedy over a wider, and more purely intrastate, body of violent crime.")
264. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 245 (1964) (affirming
constitutionality of Civil Rights Act passed under the Commerce power although applied
to a private entity); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296-297 (1964) (same). See also
Anne Carey Juliano, The More You Spend, The More You Save: Can the Spending Clause Save
the FederalAnti-Discrimination Laws?, 46 VILL. L. REv. 1111, 1146 (2001) ("Claims of dispa-
rate impact against private parties are within Congress' Commerce Clause powers."), cited
in John Arthur Laufer, Note, Alexander v. Sandoval and Its Implications for Disparate Impact
Regimes, 102 COLuM. L. REv. 1613, 1650 n. 163 (2002).
265. See supra notes 160 & 222 and accompanying texts.
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stores, and as stated, they may be ineligible for Food Stamp assistance.
The fact that these persons are not federal aid recipients should not
prevent them from challenging an injustice they face in their daily lives.
In sum, the Act would create a broad class of complainants. In
theory, a member of a non-protected class who happens to shop in a
grocery store in the neighborhood in which he works (but does not
live) could file a complaint against this store under the Act. Rather than
a detriment, this is indeed one of the better features of this act as it is
entirely plausible that those that living in neighborhoods with better
stores will have a superior basis for determining whether a particular
store is deficient in its offerings. In addition to its other benefits, by
enlarging the class of complainants, this law greatly expands the ability
of the law to reach a problem that is too often ignored.
Despite the exciting changes a new act will bring, there are po-
tential drawbacks that must be considered. Some critics might allege
that the act goes too far in several respects. First, some might note that
creating a new law is a drastic solution. However, as previously ex-
plained, this problem is not reached under current law. Perhaps critics
might state that it would be simpler to amend the current laws, such as
Title II of the Civil Rights Act, to address this problem rather than
writing a new law. There is some merit to this argument. However, by
starting fresh, prior interpretations of older laws can be avoided. More-
over, this law has a very specific purpose that would not be reached
even if retail stores were included in the public accommodations stat-
ute.This is a problem that requires its own solution.
Second, critics may complain that this proposal creates new costs
and new administrative burdens. This criticism is valid to the extent
that it recognizes that ensuring compliance under the act would require
some governmental inspection and involvement, and that such in-
volvement will come at a cost. However, the issue of healthy food is so
important that the time should be invested in making this connection.
The cost of this bill is surely less than the cost of increased obesity.
Moreover, the Act is partially self-sustaining because the fines are used
to support enforcement. While the fines will likely not be enough to
pay for the entire program-and hopefully, if the act achieves its in-
tended purpose, there should be very little fine money available-it
should help in this regard. Similarly, the bureaucracy concern is easily
dismissed. There is already an existing structure within the Department
of Agriculture that should be able to handle this. Granted, additional
personal and processes will need to be employed, but no new agencies
will be created-merely a slight realignment within the agency.
266. See supra notes 205 & 206; MSNMoneycom, Study: Working Poor Can't
Afford Basics, http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/savinganddebt/advice/studysaysworking
poorcannotaffordbasics.aspx (last visited May 1, 2009).
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Third, some may find it problematic that under the Act, the stores
would be forced to carry certain items. This is true. While skeptics
might be comfortable with requiring the stores to even out their qual-
ity, requiring stores to carry certain products in all stores may raise
more concerns because the stores are, after all, businesses and not chari-
table organizations. This concern is valid, but it is addressed through the
inclusion of the business necessity defense. If the business can demon-
strate that there is no reason to carry a certain item (i.e., carrying
Kosher items in a neighborhood with no Jewish residents), or that the
item has not sold well once it was carried, there will be no liability un-
der the act. Moreover, requiring the store to make a product available is
not terribly onerous when the act does not say that the item must be
carried in equal amounts. Therefore, a store can tailor its inventory sup-
ply to meet the demand of a particular neighborhood. Finally, the act is
limited to essential food items such as bread, meat and meat substitutes,
snacks, special dietary items (dietetic and low-salt foods), fruits, and
vegetables. Therefore, a chain would still be free to offer a variety of
items in its stores within the other categories.
Fourth, there may be concerns about how effective the monitor-
ing system proposed by the Act will be. The act relies on the reports of
customers to ensure compliance. This method may seem less than ideal
because customers are busy people and may not want to take the time
to file a complaint. Moreover, it assumes that customers have knowl-
edge of what other stores in the chain are carrying. While these are
valid concerns, the alternative would be a very costly system of gov-
ernment monitoring and compliance. That design would not only
increase the cost of implementing the act, it would also require addi-
tional bureaucracy to create and maintain the compliance system.
Moreover, while shoppers are imperfect, ultimately, it is in their own
self-interest to assist in the monitoring process, as they are the ones that
will be most affected. Ultimately, then, they are excellent candidates.
Fifth, it may be argued that the word "quality" is too broadly de-
fined. A shopper may object to a minor flaw in a product. This can be
easily solved by educating shoppers as to the types of discrepancies that
are actionable. The posters could be a great help in this regard. They
could show pictures of items that are violations and items that are not,
so shoppers can visually see the difference. The posters might also use
terms such as "substantial difference" so the shoppers will know that a
trivial difference will not matter. Agency regulations could be helpful in
delineating the contours of this issue.
Finally, critics may note that even a law such as this would be in-
sufficient to stem the rising tide of obesity and ill health. Well-worn
cliches involving horses and water may be used to make points about
the fallacy of attempting to encourage better habits through coercion.
However, another clich6 involving chickens and eggs may be equally
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helpful. Just as we can't know whether chickens or eggs came first, we
won't truly know whether this problem can't be solved until we at least
make a good faith effort to do so.
CONCLUSION
In summary, while fast food has long been a focus of the obesity
debate, grocery stores deserve more attention than they are currently
receiving for their role in contributing to the obesity epidemic. The
discussion herein and the proffered proposal make an effort to shift the
conversation in this direction. While this proposal may not cure every
ill, our society must begin somewhere.When the stakes are this high for
each individual and our nation as a whole, even a minor effect is worth
the effort.
